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REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT

Administrative agencies engaged in Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) informal rulemaking' and related policy development
are faced with the paradox of trying to protect public notice
values2 while maintaining control over policy development (which

* Legal Research Associate, Mineral Law Center, University of Kentucky College
of Law. L.L.M. 1988, University of Utah; J.D. 1983 University of Puget Sound; B.S.
1977, Beloit College.
I The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was first enacted as the Act of June
11, 1946, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., ch 324, 60 Stat. 237. It is now codified, as amended,
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., beginning at 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). Informal rulemaking is conducted pursuant to APA section 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). The classical
informal rulemaking scenario is a pre-rulemaking phase of rule drafting and intra-agency
review followed by a notice of proposed rulemaking, public comment period, closure of
public comment, the agency's evaluation of the record and final drafting, and rule
promulgation. Final rules are subject to judicial review.
2 Public notice values derive from several sources (see infra, notes 25-31 and
accompanying text). The sources overlap sufficiently that even in judicial decisions the
origin or limits of notice values are not always clear. See Davis, Administrative Common
Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 4 (discussing the holding
of Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F. 2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), to the effect that agencies should not rely upon
information known only to themselves for rulemaking support, as possibly being based
upon administrative common law, the APA, or due process, or upon some combination
of the three).
The values can be impacted by voluntary actions of the agencies or through the
intervention of stakeholders, with or without the blessings of the agency. It is the nature
of such individuals or groups to become engaged in the process as early as possible. F.
HEFRON wrrl N. McFEELEY, THE AiD~huSTSATWVE R OULAooRY PROCESS

(1983), 252-

253. This tendency may lead to unbalanced representation before the agencies. In the
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necessarily implies some measure of non-public conduct).' The
agencies employ several approaches to regulatory development,
many of which developed as responses to recommendations from
the Administrative Conference of the United States.4 In the
environmental field these include dialogues of various kinds with
interested groups in advance of an informal rulemaking step
and, perhaps, multiple rule proposals.' Hence, informal rulemaking is but one component of a complex and rather fluid
federal regulatory development system.
In this system, agencies select rule outcomes on the basis of
several factors, not all of which fall squarely within the APA
rulemaking process or records. These sources can be effectively
grouped temporally as pre-rulemaking, contemporaneous with

circumstance of agency-organized negotiated rulemakings (a pre-rulemaking activity), it
has been argued, the courts must carefully scrutinize the representational balance of the
groups involved. See Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation
of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEo.
L.J. 1625, 1702-03 (1986) (arguing that a court reviewing negotiated rules under an
arbitrary and capricious standard should assure itself that the procedures ensured participation of all affected interests).
True control of regulatory development is undoubtedly elusive, although agencies
that are able to keep the agenda before them rather than spread out at several different
sources in the government, including the courts, are in better control than those that
cannot. Control is probably most difficult to maintain in the pre-rulemaking and postrulemaking stages, due to the absence of APA procedures to direct contact to the agency.
Some have recommended instances at which the agencies should remain secretive in the
pre-rulemaking stage, as a means of maintaining control. See, e.g., BRUFF, PRESIDENTIAL
MANAO EmENT O AoENcY RuLErAmNo, 1988 ADmDISTRATvE CONFERENC OP THE UNITED
STATES RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 527, 589-91 (Report for Recommendation 889, Nov. 21, 1988). In discussing a proposal that would have required publication of
proposed rules at the time of submittal for pre-rulemaking review at the Office of
Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA),
Professor Bruff argues:
I think it better to make the drafts available only after the rulemaking
notices have been published. Publicity about the pendency of review can
only increase pressure on OIRA to engage in communications with interested persons. Instead, rulemaking procedure should be structured to guide
persons outside the government to the agency, not to the OIRA.
Id. at 591.
1 The Administrative Conference is an independent agency of the United States
Government, established in 1964. Administrative Conference Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499,
78 Stat. 615 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 571-576 (1988)). The Administrative Conference
regularly issues reports that it considers useful to its mission of improving administrative
process and has also issued well over 100 recommendations which are codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 1 CFR Ch. 3 (1989). Its membership is
limited to 91 persons by statute. The majority of the membership are representatives of
U.S. Government agencies. I CFR 301.3 (1989).
Compare cases discussed in Part II, infra.
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rulemaking, and post-rulemaking. The pre-rulemaking activities
may include data collection, 6 regulatory analyses (including environmental studies, 7 Presidential reviews, and others)," policy
research, 9 public lobbying,' 0 negotiations between "stakehold-

I See, e.g., Rybachek v. United States EPA ("Alaska Miners"), 904 F.2d 1276
(9th Cir. 1990), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 70-91.
1 Rulemakings may develop opportunities for public involvement related to compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970), codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. This involvement
may include the opportunity for comment on rulemaking-related environmental impact
statements. See, e.g., discussion of In re: Permanent Surface Mining Litig. II, Round
III, 22 Envt'l Rep. Cases (BNA) 1557, 1563-64 (1985) infra at text accompanying notes
110-119 (parties urged a reopening of rulemaking comment period after rule-related EIS
set out the agency's preferred course of action in a rulemaking then underway). The
NEPA activity related to a rulemaling is ordinarily described as part of the rule notices.
See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374, 52,382 (1988) (the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement (OSM) identifies draft environmental impact statements and preliminary regulatory impact analyses as part of pre-rulemaking in connection with a proposed
rule).
. Rulemaking analyses derive in part through operation of various statutes and
Executive Orders. Statutory sources of analysis obligations in addition to NEPA, are:
the Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 5315, 20 U.S.C. § 1221-1223, 30 U.S.C. § 1211. 42 U.S.C. § 292h, and
scattered sections of 44 U.S.C. (1980); and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No.
96-354, 94 Stat. 1164, (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 601-612 (1988)). Executive Orders directing
rulemaking analyses are Federal Regulation Requirements, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46
Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), Family Policymaking
Criteria and Regulation, Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34188 (1987), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), Federalism Considerations in Policy Formulation and Implementation, Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988), and Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected
Property Rights, Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
" See, e.g., Symposium On Valid Existing Rights, 5 J. Mn¢. L. & PoL'Y No. 3
(1989-90). This issue collects law and policy research papers germane to interpretation
of the term "valid existing rights" as applied in the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act. OSM and the University of Kentucky Mineral Law Center conducted
the Symposium in cooperation with the American Bar Association. OSM Director Harry
Snyder indicated a purpose was to "cast as wide a net as possible" in searching for a
policy solution in this difficult aspect of the surface mining program. See id. at 381-82.
,0Much of the discussion in this article concerns activities that can be broadly
grouped as' lobbying, although they are perhaps more procedurally restricted than lobbying related to other kinds of political activities. Compare the discussion of outreach
in Part I1, infra.
Some have argued that a lobbying presence analogous to that common in the
legislative process is fully warranted. See Bonfield, "The FederalAPA and State Administrative Law," 72 VA. L. REv. 297, 319 n.91 (1986) ("[Algencies must be allowed
to consider the positions of lobbyists .*..[1]f
agency rulemaking is to reflect what would
have happened in the legislature had it considered the same subject, the procedures
governing public participation during rule making must allow agencies to be 'politically
sensitive."').
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ers" and the agencies," rulemaking agenda setting,' 2 and agencydirected outreach.' 3 Contemporaneous rulemaking or rulemaking-related activities and sources include submitted rulemaking
comments,' 4 recorded contacts with stakeholders,' materials gen-

Pre-rulemaking negotiations procedures vary in the government, depending upon
the complexity of the rules under consideration and agency culture. See, generally,
Administrative Conference of the United States, Office of the Chairman, Negotiated
Rulemaking Sourcebook (1990). For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
keeps close control of its negotiated rulemakings and selectively chooses topical areas
with process management in mind. See Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirrel:
Consensus and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CoN'Tnw. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 161, 164 (1989). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has in the
past practiced a hands off policy, perhaps to avoid inferences of unfairness in later
rulemaking. OSHA sanctioned a negotiation of benzene standards but did not directly
participate in the negotiations, which were unsuccessful. This experience led to an ACUS
recommendation. See Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEo. L.J. 1625, 1647-1667 (1986).
There are apparently no broad-based statutory requirements for rule negotiations
other than eventual filtering of the negotiated product through APA rulemaking. But
see notes 149-162 and accompanying text infra (the Federal Advisory Committee Act
may apply to negotiated rulemakings and has been employed for this purpose in some
instances).
,2 The agencies employ several means of setting rulemaking agendas with constituency cooperation. The Administrative Conference's OSHA Guidelines include the following suggestions: (1) workshops at which participants could comment on regulatory
priorities before the agency compiles its initial priorities list; (2) providing access to the
results of meetings of a regulatory priorities committee following review by the Assistant
Secretary; and (3) allowing review and comment on initial rankings or proposed modifications to the lists. The list is then subject to alteration for expedited decisions on
issues referred by EPA (pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act), or requested by
the President, the Congress, or other agencies. Priority Setting and Management of
Rulemaking by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, (ACUS Recommendation 87-1), 1 CFR § 305.87-1 (1990) (preamble appearing at 52 Fed. Reg. 26, 629-30
(1987)).
" See infra discussion, Part III. Note that the current level of outreach is probably
not as advanced as it was at one time. Pre-rulemaking practices fluctuate depending
upon the agencies' rulemaking agendas and many other elements. See note 23, infra.
Compare Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946," 72
VA. L. REv. 271, 281-82 (1986) (argues that the methodology prominent in the 1970s of
trying to ensure participation on the part of all affected interests in rulemakings has
foundered, in part because of the self-selecting character of participant groups and in
part because of the lack of theoretical support for rulemaking by preference aggregation).
" 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988) (after notice, "the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments. .. ").
" The Administrative Conference has recommended conferences as a possible
phase of informal rulemaking, although it suggests that adequate public notice be given
of each meeting of this type. See, Procedures in Addition to Notice and the Opportunity
for Comment in Informal Rulemaking (ACUS Recommendation 76-3), 1 C.F.R. §
305.76-3 (1990).
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erated through pre-rulemaking activities that are incorporated
into the rulemaking record and made subject to comment, 6 and
ex parte contracts. 17 Post rulemaking sources include litigation
settlements, 8 rule-related policy interpretations, 9 interventions

,6For example, in the informal rulemaking at issue in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), discussed
infra at test accompanying notes 59-69, the rulemaking record included a pre-rulemaking
scientific report that had been generated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
Staff.
" Ex pane contacts over the course of noticed rulemaking have engendered rather
inconsistent responses from the courts. The split within the D.C. Circuit, as illustrated
by Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Action for Childrens'
Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) is noteworthy. The FCC's initial
policy response noted the discrepancies between these decisions. See 68 FCC 2d 804
(1978). The policy response was followed by rulemaking. 45 Fed. Reg. 45,582 (1980).
See generally, E. Geilhorn and G.O. Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process". An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. Cm. L. Rav. 201 (1981) (discussing these D.C. Circuit cases in
a dialectic format).
11Settlements are a growing and significant facet of informal rulemaking. The
agreements may reach beyond consensus on the terms of future rulemaking proposals
to include proscriptions of the parties' future conduct, such as a waiver of future
litigation over the rulemaking or a pledge to cooperate in the rulemaking by submitting
comments supportive of the compromise rule result. See Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by
Settlement Agreement, 73 Gao. L.J. 1241, 1274 n.204 and 1279 n.235 (1985) (discussing,
respectively, the waiver of future litigation in the settlement of National Coal Ass'n. v.
United States EPA, No. 82-1939 and consol. cases (4th Cir. Aug. 1, 1983) and the
comment submittal terms of the settlement in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2121 (DDC 1976)). (This decision is part of
the litigation that includes Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 1980), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 102-109.).
Some technical standard statutes include provisions tending to encourage the employment of post-rulemaking consent decrees. See Perritt, supra note 2, at 1635, n.48
("Federal environmental statutes have been written in many cases to facilitate the use
of federal court litigation to promote negotiated settlement of controversies between
admininstrative and private interests." (citations omitted)).
The settlement of enforcement-based litigation may result in agreements to pursue
new rulemakings. For example, in Settlement Agreement Between Save Our Cumberland
Mountains, Inc., and Manuel Lujan, Jr., Secretary, United States Dept.of the Interior,
January 24, 1990, OSM agreed to undertake several rulemaking actions related to its
permit blocking program. At Attachment A of the Agreement, OSM agreed to propose:
(1)within 180 days a rule to implement a permit application processing plan, (2) within
180 days a rule regarding procedures for rebuttal of Applicant Violator System linkages,
(3) within 270 days a rule providing that an ICP will be proposed and assessed per 30
C.F.R. pt. 846, and (4) within 180 days any rules deemed necessary to protect the due
process rights of applicants, permittees, and persons or entities deemed to be in an
ownership or control relationship with an applicant, permittee, or violator.
"1 Informal rulemaking procedures do not apply to interpretative rules or general
statements of policy. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)(1988). The boundary between exempt
policy statements and rules is imprecise. Also, dialogue involving policy choices may
impact upon later rulemakings. Assuming that there are controlling rules covering a
program function to begin with, adjustments to the manner of implementation of those
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from the Congress," and judicial interpretations. 2 The informal
rulemaking step serves as the funnel to judicial review and,
consequently, the rulemaking record and the events that transpire
during the rulemaking period receive the greatest attention of
reviewing courts."
The nature of pre-rulemaking activity is in large part a
function of the event triggering a rulemaking. The scope of
agency-initiated pre-rulemaking activities in turn impacts the
approaches taken by stakeholders. Events or actions that may

rules through policy pronouncements may be substantively significant, notwithstanding
the shield from public rulemaking scrutiny. This aspect of regulatory development
explains the omnipresent lobbying activity present at many government programs. The
level of this kind of activity is perhaps a function of agency culture. Rulemakings are
expensive undertakings, and, unless there is an ongoing rulemaking calendar that can
easily accomodat¢ a second-generation rulemaking, the agencies will most likely try to
do as much as possible under the policy exemption.
Consider, for example, the NRC's selection of a parent company guarantee policy
to implement its financial surety rules under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act. (Policy Guidance Regarding ParentCompany and Licensee Guaranteesfor Uranium
Recovery Licenses, December 30, 1985, NRC FOIA-86-705, B/17.) The applicable rules
prohibited self-insurance, but after EPA selected through rulemaking a parent company
option for one of its financial surety programs NRC followed suit with its policy
statement approach. The NRC policy skirted around the existing rule (and the conclusions
of a rule-supporting EIS) by proclaiming that parent company guarantees were not a
form of self-insurance. See Bremberg, Financial Responsibility Requirements and the
Implementation of Environmental Policy: The Case of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, 8 UCLA J. ENvrzL. L. & POL'Y 171, 196-198 (1989). The NRC
later produced a policy issue memorandum (SECY-87-253, October 9, 1987) indicating
an intent to review the parent company guarantee policy.
Programs subject to very active congressional oversight are particularly vulnerable to intervention from Members of the Congress or Committees. The Congress is a
frequent cause of reopened rulemaking comment periods; usually this indicates some
change in policy direction at the urging of Congress. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 5430 (1988)
(OSM reopened a rulemaking comment period in response to the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs). This rulemaking is discussed infra at notes 186-196 and
accompanying text.
11 The advent of full scale, long-running regulatory program litigation has given
the judiciary an extraordinary role in shaping the outcome of rulemakings and other
regulatory development. Examples of these kinds of cases are the Clean Water Act line
including Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act line including in re Permanent
Surface Mining Litigation II, 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (1985). See infra, Part
I1.
, Technically, judicial review of an informal rulemaking (or other action subject
to review under the APA) is premised upon the whole record or parts of it cited by a
party. 5 U.S.C. 706 (1988). This article establishes that, at least in the context of fairness
reviews, courts are willing to consider ex-APA sources (meaning sources not part of the
rulemaking record). These kinds of occurences, however, have not appeared to be
outcome determinative. See generally, discussion, Part 11.
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lead to rulemakings include: (1) congressional or judicial directives; (2) agency initiatives or investigations; (3) public petitions;
(4) another agency's action or initiative; or (5) advisory committee proposals." Congressional and executive oversight and
appropriations policy can also be significant factors.2 Rulemakings that are contentious to begin with, e.g., those that are spinoffs of remand orders, congressional interventions, or public
petitions, probably have the strongest political following and
may, thus, be the subject of the greatest lobbying pressure in
the pre-rulemaking phase.
Public notice values are a central element of procedures
under several procedural statutes and orders. Executive Order
12291 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act require twice yearly
(October and April) Federal Register publication of agency rulemaking agendas. 25 Various program-specific hybrid rulemaking
procedures mandate open contact schemes incidental to rulemaking. 26 The Freedom of Information Act 27 and the Federal

"' See Administrative Conference of the United States, Office of the Chairman, A
Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 84-86 (1983) (noting connection between triggering
event and type of agency-directed pre-rulemaking activity).
2 The effect of active congressional oversight is apparent in the administration of
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The House Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee has maintained an active oversight, to the point of directing proposed rule
redrafting and reopening of rulemaking comment periods. See 54 Fed. Reg. 52,092,
52,093 (1989).
Appropriations are a viable and, at times, unpredictable mechanism of congressional
control over regulatory action. See, e.g., Conference Report on H.R. 1827, CoNo. REc.
H5651, H5666 (daily ed., June 27, 1987). In this report, the managers announced plans
to prohibit implementation of a certain proposed mineral product valuation rule, and
stated, regarding the agency's rulemaking:
The managers understand that [the Minerals Management Service or MMS]
will publish draft regulations in fimal form on or before August 17, 1987
for coal, oil and gas, announce in that Federal Register notice a short
comment period, and then publish final regulations on or before September
30, 1987. The managers continue to be concerned with obtaining workable
regulations from the Minerals Management Service and hope that new
regulations can go forward in fiscal year 1988. (Emphasis added).
See infra note 163, discussing the course pursued by the MMS.
Therefore, although Congress no longer has the authority to exert Legislative Vetos
over agency actions, per Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983), it is not without the capacity to influence rulemaking outcomes.
See supra note 8.
The hybrid rulemaking scheme applicable to the Federal Trade Commission's
rulemaking program entails a constituency outreach step and fiscal support of citizens'
group intervention in the process. The Administrative Conference has issued several
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Advisory Committee Actu provide for access to some materials
and meetings. The agencies' ethical standards based upon the
Government in the Sunshine Act 29 also may provide avenues for
informed access. And, notwithstanding any of those sources, of
course, the First Amendment establishes the paramount right of
the people to petition the government, including the admimistrative agencies? ° Hence, the question of accessibility in a general
sense is rarely in issue; the question of informed, fully noticed
access often is. Judicial review of rulemaking fairness is the
principal context of these kinds of disputes, 3 although clearly a
number of policies supportive of public notice values have
32
emerged in response to other stimuli.
The entire issue of public notice in regulatory development
has a long history and a strong imprimatur of pre-APA common
law or administrative practice norms. A glance at APA history

guidelines in connection with the FTC program; these guidelines serve also to influence
the conduct of other agencies. See I C.F.R. § 305.79-1 (1990).
" Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 1,80 Stat. 383
(codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
The OSM made outreach materials available for this research pursuant to a FOIA
request from the author. Correspondence of March 14, 1989, Joan F. Shaw, FOIA
Officer, to B. Bremberg and documents.
" Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. I at 1175 (1988).
29 Since 1976, the Government in the Sunshine Act has prohibited ex parte contacts
in the context of certain public administrative proceedings that require a hearing. Pub.
L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1988)). On the
basis of this authority, some agencies have adopted ex parte rules of broad application.
The SEC's regulations provide that Commission members are to avoid creating any
impressions of undue influence, in addition to strictly adhering to the SEC's Government
in the Sunshine Act-based ex parte rules. 17 C.F.R. § 200.61 (1990).
10U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting ...the right
of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.") This right to petition extends to the petitioning of all branches of Government, including the administrative agencies. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (the Noerr-Pennington doctrine of antitrust immunity for certain protected petitioning activities was extended to the petitioning of
administrative agencies, subject to a narrow sham exception in cases of interference with
the rights of others to participate). This principle has been recognized in application of
citizens' participation rights under environmental protection statutes. Webb v. Fury, 282
S.E.2d 28 (W.Va. 1981) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act). Also see
Annotation, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment Right to Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances, 30 L.Ed 2d 914 and Annotation, "Sham" Exception to Application of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, Exempting From Federal Antitrust
Laws Joint Efforts to Influence Governmental Action, 71 A.L.R. Fed. 723.
3"See generally discussion of rulemaking cases, infra, Part II.
,2The greatest activity in this realm is the Congress' enactment of agency-specific
hybrid rulemaking requirements.
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explains the origin of this kind of problem and sets its current
aspects in perspective. In the years leading up to APA enactment, contacts between agencies and their constituencies were a
routine part of rulemaking. 33 For example, the Department of
Labor circulated draft rules to trade and labor groups. 34 It is
noteworthy, however, that the emphasis on notice concerns has
shifted somewhat since that time. Apparently in the 1940s, concerns regarding public notice centered on the goal of achieving
3
full disclosure of applicable rules and policies as adopted,
rather than on improving notice of the early stages of regulatory
development.3 6 The current interest in pre-rulemaking is a func-

31 The concept of wide open public commentary on rulemaking is a creature of
the APA; the pre-APA practices may have approximated that result, at times, but more
commonly resembled today's pre-rulemaking practices. Four types of rulemaking procedures were recognized. These were: investigative procedure; consultative procedure;
auditive procedure; and adversary procedure. Investigative procedure was analogous to
legislative factfinding. Consultative procedure involved receiving opinions, advice, and
suggestions from groups that were affected by the work of the agencies. This practice
was especially prevalent in areas of economic regulation. The Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Food and Drug Administration, and many others followed this
practice. Auditive procedure involved informal hearings at which interested parties could
comment on proposals. The adversary procedure was based on the railroad regulation
model and involved formal evidentiary hearings and legislative findings (rules) based
largely upon the record. Whether agencies could go outside the record to make rules
was debated in the literature at the time. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative RuleMaking, 52 HRv.L.R. 259, 273-280 (1938-39).
11The Division of Public Contracts, Department of Labor (administering the
Walsh-Healey Act) had no established procedure for promulgation of regulations, although regular staff conferences addressed rulemaking needs. The Division had never
held hearings in connection with rulemaking. However, after preparing drafts the Division did consult the purchasing departments of the Government that would be affected
by the proposed regulation and also circulated drafts to trade associations and labor
organizations. On some occasions the Administrator asked interested parties to confer
prior to the preparation of a draft. Part 1, Division of Public contracts, Department of
Labor, The Walsh-Healey Act, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies,
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No.
186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 33-34 (1940).
1 In the case of the Veterans' Administration, only the "substantive" regulations
were published in the Federal Register. However, the service organizations and Administration staff received copies of all regulations. Id. at 40-41.
'
See, e.g., Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REv. 363, 381, 391
(1986) ("The report of the Attorney General's Committee [Final Committee Report
(Staff of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Administrative
Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) at
114-15], keeping with the views of its director [Walter Gellhorn], portrayed rulemaking
less as a tool of legislative decisionmaking than as a vehicle for announcing agency
policy to the outside world. The essential point was not how rules were made but that
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tion of the changing system of regulatory development, which,
arguably, is steadily growing more akin to the "free for all"
and typically do
pre-APA system. Organized participants can
37
influence.
of
level
enjoy a disproportionate
Not suprisingly, the Administrative Conference has seen fit
to ponder the topic of notice as it relates to ex-APA processes.
Its guidance is fully reflective of the political character of regulatory development-witness its 1976 directive encouraging prerulemaking notices to the public, and its 1983 directive essentially
discouraging this practice. 3 Of course, recognizing that political
compromise is a factor in rulemaking 39 merely serves to remind
that the impact of any particular event or source of data on rule
outcomes is difficult to measure or predict.
The agencies' rationales for engaging in ex-APA regulatory
development are varied. Among them are a desire to concentrate
lobbying at the agency level (tied to maintaining control over
the rulemaking), 40 a perceived need to rely upon private groups
or organizations for technical expertise 4 1 an interest in accom-

they were announced." And, "Walter Gellhorn particularly emphasized the notice aspect
of rulemaking in his contemporaneous text and casebook. See W. Gellhorn, [FEDERAL
ADnDmTRATlvE PRocEEDINos 116-44 (1941)] and W. Gellhorn, [ADxMDIsTRATIVE LAW:
CAS.S AND CommErs 331-554 (1940).J)"
" The pattern was well in place in the mid 1970s. See Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1667, 1775 (1975) ("Indeed, the
content of rulemaking decisions is often largely determined in advance through a process
of informal consultation in which organized interests may enjoy a preponderant influence.").
" The Administrative Conference recommended in 1976 that agencies consider
voluntary publication of advance notices of proposed rulemaking (ANPRMs). However,
by 1983 the Conference conceded that "for rulemaking governed only by section 553 of
the APA, an agency publishes an ANPRM, instead of a notice of proposed rulemaking,
for mostly psychological-not legal-reasons. Section 553 does not require the agency
to publish the terms or text of a proposed rule, and, in any event, the agency is free to
change its mind about the contents of the rule." Administrative Conference of the
United States, Office of the Chairman, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking (1983)
p. 103.
- See Gaba, supra, note 18, at 1250-51 (changes in regulations are generally the
result of compromise between the agency and stakeholders, but "[tihe compromise might
neither represent the preferred positions of those parties, nor be supported by any
information in the record. This is especially true of [EPA] regulations containing specific
numerical limitations.")
40 See Bruff, supra note 3.
4
This practice runs the risk of inference that the agency has become captured by
its regulated community. See Note, SurrogateRule Making: Problems and Possibilities
Under the APA, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1038 (1988) (arguing that agencies that accept
compromise rules from their regulated community are primarily influenced by the
industry under regulation).
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modating diverse interests as early as possible in the process,4 2
and an interest in avoiding reviewable procedures. 43 Notice levels
vary from essentially a total blackout to policies that are closer
to full disclosure;" most agencies in the environmental protection
field are probably operating closer to open disclosure than to
blackout.

4

In 1978, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.46 constrained to a large degree the role of courts
in expanding notice value protections beyond the terms of the
APA because of constitutional or applicable statutory proscriptions. 47 However, similar kinds of results-that is, more detailed

42

Reviews prior to noticed rulemaking can be used to: (1) evaluate factual analysis

compiled by staff; (2) compare the legal and policy conclusions of the staff with existing
agency policy and the applicable legal regime; (3) obtain internal review from all
interested groups, identifying the disagreements; (4) check the documents for quality and
formatting; and (5)produce agreement on the specific procedures and other agency
actions that will be employed in the rulemaking. Administrative Comference of the
United States, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking (1983), at 92.
•3The Administrative Conference notes:
Exposure of the staff's investigative results and preferred regulatory approach to public criticism before publication of the [notice of proposed
rulemaking] has the advantage of permitting changes in the proposal without adherence to any procedural requirements. Early consultation with

potentially interested persons also demonstrates an open mind by the
agency, particularly when changes are made in response to criticisms.
Id. at 102 (Emphasis added).
- The dichotomy is brought into focus by the opinions in Wolfe v. Department
of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. en banc 1988), discussed infra
at note 139. The Wolfe court upheld a non-disclosure of pre-rulemaking information by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, although acknowledging that other agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, engaged in much more open practices with
the same type of information.
41 This is the inference I have drawn from the cases and policies reviewed for this
article.
,-435 U.S. 519 (1978).

4 The principal issue before the Court in Vermont Yankee was whether cross
examination and other hearing procedures were required in a particular informal rulemaking. It held that these additional procedures were not necessary. The decision is
most noted for an additional statement, actually at the beginning of the opinion, that
sets out the notion that courts lack authority to expand upon the APA minimal level of
procedures. Justice Rehnquist stated in summary:
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of
their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them
if the agencies have not chosen to grant them. This is not to say necessarily
that there are no circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond
those required by the statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are
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agency activity over the course of rulemaking-have resulted
from reviews citing substantive rule content problems rather than
procedural compliance issuesAs Agencies are not prevented from
engaging in ex-APA activities, nor are courts prevented from
considering the impact of those activities (that, if initiated by
the agencies, technically are procedures over and above the APA
minima) .49
This climate raises some interesting quandries: if ex-APA
sources influence rule outcomes, how should these sources factor
into considerations of rulemaking fairness? Should reviewing
courts bootstrap ex-APA histories or sources into rulemaking

fairness analyses, such as in cases raising questions or rulemaking
"due process"" or the closely related APA-based concept of
rulemaking notice adequacy?5 If not, can normative agency
extremely rare.

Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. See K. DAvis, ADMNISTRATIVE

LAW

29:18 (2d ed.

1984) (characterizing this limit on judicial authority as dicta that has been departed from
in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
which required, in the form of an explanation of rulemaking choices, a procedure over
and above the APA minima).
" See infra note 170 and accompanying text. The shift to substantive-based reviews
following Vermont Yankee is well chronicled in M. Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future,
72 VA. L. REv. 447 (1986).
49In Vermont Yankee, the reviewing courts had before them a record of substantial
pre-rulemaking activity. This included record development in the context of earlier
adjudicatory proceedings, preparation and circulation of staff reports and documentation, and, it can be inferred, a rather well-developed ongoing dialogue involving all
parties.
The nature of NRC's ex-APA activities was raised before the Supreme Court, but
none were found to be dispositive of any points. Plaintiffs argued that some other of
NRC's past ex-APA practices were indicia that the informal rulemaking at issue was
inadequate. The gist of this argument was that in combination with NEPA's application
in the rulemaking, past agency practices, and the statutory mandate under which the
NRC operates justified the D.C. Circuit's imposition of procedures over and above the
APA minima. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548. Regarding the past agency practices
issue, which conceptually correlates with the idea of agency norms discussed at the
conclusion of this article, the plaintiffs were unable to overcome suspicions that the past
practices to which they alluded were in fact an aberration in themselves.
Significantly, the Court does not find one way or the other on the question of
whether reviews of these kinds of added-procedure policies should or should not be a
part of rulemaking judicial reviews. See id. at 542, n.17.
" Compare, generally, E. Gellhorn and G.O. Robinson, supra, note 17 (examining
ex parte contacts during rulemaking). This article, of course, explores the ex-APA side
of regulatory development but notes jurisprudential tendencies similar to the ex parte
cases; in short, courts are reaching beyond the limits of APA records and time frames
in rulemaking fairness cases. The results are mixed.
11 See, e.g., In re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litg. II, Round III, 22
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (D.D.C. 1985), discussed infra at text accompanying notes
110-119.
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conduct or legal support from sources other than the APA
negate inferences of unfairness?12 Should the judicial inquiry be
more rigorous in the setting of negotiated rulemaking reviews?"
Do Vermont Yankee and other authorities limit the powers of
courts to consider agency adopted ex-APA procedures as part
of APA fairness reviews?
In an effort to address these questions, I first consider several
recent environmental policy rulemaking cases, starting with Vermont Yankee, but concentrating on several subsequent lower
federal courts decisions that squarely addressed rulemaking fairness, a question that was not before the Supreme Court in
Vermont Yankee. The opinions in these later lower federal court
cases have incorporated or have appeared to incorporate exAPA histories into analyses of rulemaking fairness (generally in
the form of claims based upon the due process clause or notice
provisions of the APA). These opinions are an appropriate study
vehicle because of their depth of record discussion. Second, and
perhaps of more significance in terms of rulemaking fairness
objectives, I examine policies of the agencies. The focus of this
discussion is the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement's (OSM's)14 pre-rulemaking outreach program.
Lastly I consider the possible role of these kinds of policies in
judicial reviews of rulemaking fairness.
II.

JuDIciAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

RULEMAKUNGS: LOOKING BEYOND THE

FouR CORNERS OF THE

APA PROCESSES
Since the Supreme Court issued its Vermont Yankee decision,
several lower federal court cases have reviewed fairness aspects

I choose to think of rulemaking fairness in a normative sense because, as I
point out in later analysis, policies favoring informed representation of all interests in
rulemakings are, compared to the strict doctrinal support, the healthier side of the
equation. Normative questions, after all, are about values. As the norms evolve they
come to be recognized as a contrast to more cut and dried concepts, legal or otherwise.
See, ETacAL Issuas n PROFESSIONAL Ln, 6-7 (J.Callahan, ed., 1988) (defining idea
of normative questions).
" See Perritt, supra, note 2.
Although formally the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement,
the agency was, early in its history, generally known by the acronym "OSM" as it is
currently. During much of the 1980s it was called (in official notices) "OSMRE." This
Article uses "OSM" with the exception of some quoted material. The states with
approved programs are known as "primacy states."
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of complex, extended environmental policy informal rulemakings. At a general level, these cases are not unlike Vermont
Yankee, which, as noted above, concerned environmental policy
informal rulemaking with a substantial pre-rulemaking component, although fairness of the actual rulemaking was not determined in the Supreme Court's decision."
On occasion these reviews have included direct or indirect
consideration of ex-APA activities and sources that the agencies
had brought into the process of regulatory development. Put
another way, the courts have been considering the impact that
"procedures" over and above the APA procedures (and set in
a pre-rulemaking stage) have on the fairness of informal rulemaking. That is not to say, as pointed out in the following
sections, that the lower courts are squarely requiring supplemental procedures. Nonetheless, the boundaries between APA processes and ex-APA processes, apart from the formal division
established by issuance of a proposed rulemaking notice in the
Federal Register, are somewhat indistinct.
This is similar to a court's determination as to whether a
legal instrument, such as a deed, is sufficiently ambiguous to
warrant the use of extrinsic evidence as an interpretative aid.
The role of that extrinsic evidence as adding to the result is
sometimes readily apparent, although the court insists that its
interpretation is being based solely on the material "within the
four corners" of the instrument. By analogy, if a rulemaking
complies with the bare minima of APA processes, its fairness is
without serious doubt (is not ambiguous) and hence, resort to
extrinsic fairness indicators, such as ex-APA activities and
sources, is not indicated. Of course, that is not really the way
it works in either deed interpretation cases or in APA reviews.
How else can the ex parte contact cases be explained? The courts
in those cases have been more than willing to consider extrinsic
evidence of unfairness or agency bias, even though all the APA
6
processes appear to be in order.

The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals on the question of the
rulemaking compliance with the APA. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549.
" Ironically, these ex parte contact cases have served to lend "legitimacy" to
interventions in the pre-rulemaking and post-rulemaking phases of regulatory development. See J. O'REELLY, ADmNSTRATrVE RuLs.m~Nao, § 4.02 at 69 (1983), and Perritt,
supra, note 2, at 1699 (1986) (relying on the implied findings of Home Box Office v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Iowa State Commerce Comm'n v. Office of
Fed. Inspector, 730 F.2d 1566, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984) that contacts are only restricted
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The cases that have taken the next step of considering exAPA aspects of regulatory development are noteworthy on several levels. These cases may signal how courts will evaluate one
of the issues left unanswered in Vermont Yankee: how ex-APA
activities might factor into analyses of rulemaking fairness. The
cases may also serve eventually as a policy framework under
which agencies will develop future ex-APA activities for use
along with subsequent rulemakings.
Although it may foreshadow controversy, courts are looking
very favorably on the ex-APA practices. For illustration, agency
shielding of the pre-rulemaking Presidential review process has
been rigorous. 7 Nevertheless it is indeed very difficult to forecast
future public intervention/agency bias scenarios. Thus, the prospect of courts reaching farther into pre-rulemaking political history for a spin on rulemaking fairness remains plausible.
Vermont Yankee
In Vermont Yankee' s the Supreme Court considered the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) use of informal rulemaking for establishing numerical values, if any, to be assigned
the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle in cost
benefit analyses for nuclear power plant licensing decisions. This

following the start of rulemaking, i.e., after public notice of proposed rulemaking is
given.)
17 In ACUS Recommendation 88-9, Presidential review of agency rulemaking (to
be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-9, 54 Fed. Reg. 5,207 (1989)), the Administrative
Conference recommends that Presidential review should apply generally to federal rulemaking but that the Presidential review process should not create any substantive or
1, 7. The Conference recomprocedural rights enforceable by judicial review. Id.,
mends:
An agency engaged in informal rulemaking should be free to receive
guidance concerning that rulemaking at any time from the President,
members of the Executive Office of the President, and other members of
the Executive Branch, without having a duty to place these communications
in the public file of the rulemaking unless otherwise required by law.
However, official written policy guidance from the officer responsible for
presidential review of rulemaking should be included in the public file of
the rulemaking once a notice proposed rulemaking or final rule to which
it pertains is issued or when the rulemaking is terminated without issuance
of a final rule.
54 Fed. Reg. at 5,208,
5(a).
Note that this interpretation modifies the Conference's position previously set out
in Recommendation 80-6, Intragovernmental Communications in Informal Rulemaking
1.
Proceedings, I C.F.R. § 305.80-6,
M 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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informal rulemaking action was a spin-off of various pending
adjudicatory reactor licensing proceedings.5 9
The NRC's selected procedures involved pre-hearing distribution of several staff documents, 60 including a pre-rulemaking
NRC technical report titled "Environmental Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," 6 ' and an informal hearing. Testifiers were
subject to questioning from the Commission but were not subject
to cross examination from the parties. The record, including a
transcript of the hearing, remained open for thirty days following the hearing for additional comment. Following this step, the
staff filed a supplemental document to clarify the pre-rulemaking
report. The Commission then adopted a rule specifying numerical standards that would be applied in the environmental reviews
for all licenses and approving of the informal rulemaking procedures.

62

.The Court of Appeals panel found these proceedings inadequate and overturned the rule. It ruled with respect to the
Vermont Yankee license that the Commission must deal with
fuel cycle environmental impacts in individual licensing proceedings, 63 notwithstanding the fact that the impacts would be substantially identical for any plant. 6
In determining that the Court of Appeals should not have
imposed adjudicatory requirements as part of this informal rulemaking, 65 the United States Supreme Court sought to right a
fundamental misconception of the "nature of the standard for
judicial review of an agency rule." 66 The Court's complex hold19 See id. at 528-530.
m Id. at 530, n.7. (Eleven documents were made available to all parties several
weeks before the hearing.)
Id. at 528.
62 Id. at 529-30.
61 This is how the Supreme Court characterized the holding of the Court of
Appeals. Id. at 535.
" The uranium fuel cycle consists of a front end (mining and processing of uranium
ore, enrichment, and fabrication of fuel for use in a reactor) and, following use of the
fuel in a reactor, a back end (management of the spent reactor fuel). Usable uranium
and plutonium fuel can be recovered from spent reactor fuel, hence the term "fuel
cycle." All aspects of the cycle may have environmental consequences, but, because the
increment of fuel cycle activity attributable to each plant is basically the same, the NRC
decided that, for EIS purposes, factors of universal application should be adopted. See
generally Bremberg, supra, note 19, at 174, n. 11.
65 There was no serious dispute as to NRC's authority to handle this matter as
part of an informal rulemaking. The issue was whether the informal rulemaking procedures employed were adequate. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 535, n. 13.
Id. at 547.
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ing addressed this point arising out of the Vermont Yankee
licensing. It states that procedures over and above the APA
minima were not necessary in this rulemaking because the Congress left the matter up to the agencies' discretion and not to
the courts, absent violation of constitutional proscriptions, nonAPA statutory standards, or some other compelling reason. 67
Of particular interest on the score of ex-APA activities, the
United States Supreme Court also noted that the Court of Appeals had made a finding of procedural inadequacy solely on
the basis of "the record actually produced at the hearing, and
not on the basis of the information available to the agency when
it made the decision to structure the proceedings in a certain
way. This sort of Monday morning quarterbacking not only
encourages but almost compels ... adjudicatory hearings.""
Thus, the Court implicitly recognizes that review beyond the
narrow APA record (the hearing record) may be warranted in a
fairness determination. Of course, this particular point was not
before the Court, but was mentioned as an indication of the
dangers of reviewing courts ignoring relevant information. In
this circumstance, the reviewing Court of Appeals clearly had
ignored some rulemaking record materials, as well as ex-APA
sources.
Therefore, the Vermont Yankee decision leaves one of the
more curious features of the APA intact-namely that the agencies are vested with the flexibility to create procedures, and even
balance the fairness of procedures, subject to review within the
narrower framework of the APA process. Ex-APA activities or
sources may be a relevant inquiry for a reviewing court in some
circumstances .69
Alaska Miners
A panel of the Ninth Circuit, in Rybachek v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("Alaska Miners"),70 exam67 See id. at 543 (discussing FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) (agencies
should be free to shape their own procedures)).
Id. at 547.
'4 The cases collected in this Part describe circumstances in which this may be the
case. Consider, for example, the Vermont Yankee opinion's passing inquiry into whether
a well-settled agency procedure (of the kind over and above the APA minima) would
be enforceable judicially in the event that an agency later changed its procedures. See
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 542, n.17. Presumably, these kinds of procedures could
include ex-APA activities if linked to later rulemakings.
-1.1904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990). Petitioners in No. 88-7393 are Stanley C. Ryba-
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ined fairness issues 7l concerning an extended Clean Water Actbased rulemaking 72 that had entailed several documented prerulemaking activities and multiple rule proposals. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) rules in question established
operational standards for placer mining. 7" The miners' group
challenging the rules argued that portions of the final rules bore
little resemblance to proposals that had been the subject of
noticed public rulemaking comment periods and that the EPA's
presentation of data was so incomprehensible it rendered the
rulemaking unfair.
Regulatory development consisted of original field data collection at operating placer mines, as well as outreach meetings
with interested parties to discuss a Development Document.7 4
Before EPA completed the rulemaking it conducted two public
comment periods on rule proposals. In fact, the lengthiness of
the process led to an unusual United States District Court Order
instructing EPA to complete the rulemaking by a certain date.7"

chek and Rosalie A. Rybachek; the Petitioner in No. 88-7403 is the Alaska Miners
Association, Inc. This article will refer to this decision as "Alaska Miners."
71 This article discusses the fairess-based aspects of the court's decision.
As is
common in rulemaking litigation over technical standard environmental regulations, the
court also had before it issues concerning the "merits" or substantive validity of the
rules. See Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1289-93.
12 The court followed convention and referred to the scheme under 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 as the "Clean Water Act." Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1282. The final
regulation was promulgated at 53 Fed. Reg. 18,764 (1988) and is codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 440 (1989).
" Placer mining entails recovery of gold or other detrital minerals from gravels.
Operations are usually in close association with active streams and run the risk of
contaminating the streams with abnormal sediment loads and other mine processing
wastes. The activities are described in the rulemaking preamble, 53 Fed. Reg. 18,764
(1988). See also Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1283, n.3 and generally J. H. Wells, Placer
Examination-Principlesand Practice, Bureau of Land Management Tech. Bull. 4

(1973).
74 In addition to collecting field data, EPA circulated rule development reports
and held workshops with the public prior to proposing a rule, and analyzed comments
from 112 sources, comprising approximately 1300 separate comments. See preamble to
the final rule, particularly 53 Fed. Reg. 18,764, 18,781 (1988) (public participation and
response to major comments). The principal compilation of this information incorporated
into the record was EPA, Development Document for Proposed Effluent Limitations
Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Ore Mining and Dressing
Point Source Category, Gold Placer Mine Subcategory (1985). EPA included this document in its Court of Appeals brief appendix. See Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1287,
n.ll.
" Trustees For Alaska v. Thomas, No. A85-440 (D. Alaska, May 7, 1986), as
modifled February 1, 1988, cited at 53 Fed. Reg. 18,764 (1988) (the District Court
ordered EPA to complete this rulemaking by a date certain; it granted an extension in
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The miners and miners' groups framed the fairness issues in
terms of due process and the APA. The due process contentions
concerned EPA's post-comment period additions to the rulemaking record and the adequacy of proposed rulemaking notices. 76 The key APA claims stated that EPA had presented
rulemaking data in an incomprehensible morass."
The Ninth Circuit panel easily dispatched the issues of postcomment period record addition and data presentment. EPA
had added over 6000 pages to the rulemaking record following
the close of the final public comment period. In rejecting an
argument that this obstructed meaningful public comment on
the record, the court construed the added record as a permissible
"response to comments made during a public-comment period." ' 78 The data presentment issue gained little sympathy from
the court which noted "countless other administrative rulemak79
ings" have equally complex records.
The notice adequacy issues were more difficult to analyze,
as they involved two separate proposed rule notices in which
EPA had posited several regulatory alternatives tracking statutory Clean Water Act schemes. Among those mentioned in both
notices and a draft Development Document was EPA's authority

the modification). These kinds of orders may be on the increase in the health and safety
area generally, although they remain unusual. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, 724 F.Supp. 1013 (D.D.C.
1989) (ordering the FDA to promulgate Toxic Shock Syndrome-related tampon absorbency labeling regulations by a date certain). Compare, United States SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (upon finding that additional evidence should be
considered by an agency in order to assure proper judicial review a reviewing court
should not generally dictate "to the agency the methods, procedures, and time dimension
of the needed inquiry.. .") (Emphasis added).
16See 50 Fed. Reg. 47,982 (November 20, 1985) (original rule proposal); 52 Fed.
Reg. 9,414 (March 24, 1987) (second notice of new information and request for comments).
" The claims also stated that EPA had falsified evidence and improperly processed
data. Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1295.
78 The court projected a never ending cycle of public comments followed by agency
response, followed by another round of public comments. Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at
1286, (citing for comparison BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 644-45
(1st Cir. 1979) (agencies should be encouraged to use new information without risking
the requirement of a new public comment period), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980),
later proceeding, 614 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1980)).
" Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1295. The court cites, as example, Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n. v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, clarified, 885 F.2d 253, later proceeding, 885 F.2d 1276
(5th Cir. 1989) (the administrative record exceeded 600,000 pages, covering difficult
technical subjects related to production of organic chemicals, synthetic fibers, and
plastics).
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to impose best management practices (BMPs). One notice also
described the permit-issuing authorities' possible imposition of
BMPs. 80 EPA indicated a possible case-by-case application of
BMP criteria.8' But, EPA did not propose specific BMP rule
language. The notices gave only a relatively short treatment of
the basis for proposed BMPs; in contrast, the final rule preamble
included a comparatively lengthy description of the final rule's
82
five BMPs.
Regarding best available technology (BAT), 3 EPA's first
notice indicated a probable exemption from a water recycling
BAT for small mines on economic feasibility grounds.94 In its
second notice, however, EPA revised its economic findings, concluding that recycling was economically possible for small operations but that chemical treatment methods did not appear to
be. It solicited comments.85 The notice discussed several nonBAT regulatory alternatives, including limitations based on best
practicable technology, best conventional technology, and new
source performance standards."
In approving the adequacy of EPA's BMP notices, the court
invoked three criteria. These are the APA's required linkage of
87
the notice's "subjects and issues involved" with the final rule,
Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1287. See 50 Fed. Reg. 47,982, 48,000; 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(c) (1982) (BMP authority).
SSee 50 Fed. Reg. 47,982, 48,000, discussed in Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1287-

88.
See 50 Fed. Reg. 47,982, 48,000 (1985) and 52 Fed. Reg. 9,414, 9,416 (1987)
(brief separate sections describe BMPs). The brevity of these sections is startling: the
second notice merely identifies analysis present in the Development Document for the
first rule notice and concludes: "Suggested BMPs included construction of settling ponds
with adequate drainage and storm water diversions around the pond, and recontouring
of surface mines and waste piles to decrease erosion and prevent infiltration of water

into the mine area." From that threshold, the final rule imposed a complicated fivestep BMP requirement for each NPDES permit. These steps cover surface water diversion, berm construction, pollutant materials storage, new water control, and maintenance
of water control and solids retention devices. See 52 Fed. Reg. 18,785-786 (1987)
(preamble description of the final rule BMPs).
"3Best available technology economically achievable are standards that must be
both capable of economical implementation and technologically available. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(2)(A) & (B) (1982). Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1290.
- The exemption would have applied to mines handling between 20 and 500 cubic
yards of material per day. Recycling was proposed for larger operations. See 50 Fed.
Reg. at 47,995 (1985).
0 See 52 Fed. Reg. at 9,423-24 (1987).
- See 52 Fed. Reg. at 9,419-26 (1987) (Data analysis and regulatory options).
"mhe EPA is only required to publish in this context the 'terms or substance

of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved'. 5 U.S.C. §
553(bX3) (1988)." Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1287.

1990-91]

PRE-RuEmTAKjNO FAnuss

and two judicially-recognized criteria: that precise notice of possible final rule language is not required 88 and that rules must
be a "logical outgrowth" from the notice. 89
The procedural analysis concerning BAT standards for all
mines (i.e., selection of the water recycling standard for small
mines as well as large ones) was simpler. The court upheld these
rules because the notice for the second comment period clearly
pointed out the EPA's changed economic analysis regarding
small mines and provided an opportunity for comment on that
point.90
The significance of Alaska Miners is its implied recognition
that fairness protection is afforded in rulemakings involving
open, protracted record development. This fairness protection is
extant provided the rule choices are discernible from notices or
pre-rulemaking records that were incorporated into the rulemaking record. It implies that the activities conducted in the prerulemaking period are an added source of notice if conducted
in a reasonably open manner. Multiple opportunity for consideration of an ill-defined "laundry list" of regulatory alternatives
is sufficient notice, even if the connection to final rule language
is fuzzy at best. It is noteworthy that the court's opinion relies
upon the rulemaking record's Development Document as partial
support of notice to the parties of the BMP alternative. The
Development Document is a collection of regulatory and scientific research information assembled prior to rulemaking. 9' This
source had been based in part on meetings involving the parties.
Quivira Mining
In Quivira Mining Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (Quivira),92 a panel of the Tenth Circuit reviewed
fairness aspects of a politically charged, extended rulemaking
involving standards for remedial actions at uranium and thorium
mill tailings sites. In this case, the Kerr-McGee Corporation

6 Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1287 (citing California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United
States, 375 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967)).
"The court referenced, for example, American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954,
959 n. 13 (4th Cir. 1981) (an agency may make substantial changes from notice to final
rule if they "are in character with the original proposal and are a logical outgrowth of
the notice and comments already given.") Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1288.
0Alaska Miners, 904 F.2d at 1288.
" See supra note 72.
866 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir.1989).
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challenged, on due process grounds, a portion of the rules that
applied to its thorium mill site. Kerr-McGee owned the only
such site subject to the rules. 93 The rules in question9 implemented the Uranimum Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA). 95
The core of this dispute was actually foreshadowed by the
structure of UMTRCA. First, UMTRCA provides an administrative role for both the EPA and the NRC. The EPA is charged
with setting standards of "general application." Implementation
of those standards rests with NRC or approved state agencies.9
Second, UMTRCA links the regulation of uranium mill tailings
sites and thorium mill tailings sites under one program because7
of substantially similar environmental hazards present at both.
Predictably, in this informal rulemaking NRC drew record from
independent actions of NRC and EPA. NRC adopted the EPA
finding that uranium and thorium wastes should be treated as
comparable hazards and made subject to the same numerical
standards.98
Kerr-McGee Corporation, citing its circumstance as owner
of the only thorium mill site subject to the remedial regulations,
argued that the rulemaking infringed its due process rights. The
court found, in essence, that several factors considered in combination indicated no due process violation. Relying upon the
broad health protection scope and prospective nature of the
rules, the court's opinion rejected arguments that as the singular
regulated party Kerr-McGee was entitled to an adjudicatory pro-

Kerr-McGee Corporation's closed West Chicago Rare Earths plant site. See
Quivira Mining, 866 F.2d at 1261.
- The challenged regulations were promulgated at 50 Fed. Reg. 41,861 app. A,
(1985), codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 40 app. A. (1989).
" Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. Title II of UMTRCA, the basis of the rulemaking in
dispute in this matter, amended sections 83, 84, 161, 274 and 275 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (AEA), 42 U.S.C. § 2011.
The EPA's authority is set out at 42 U.S.C. § 2022 (1982). Regarding the role
of states under the AEA's cooperative federalism scheme see Bremberg, supra note 19,
at 174-183.
" UMTRCA amended the AEA to bring uranium and thorium mill tailings within
NRC licensing jurisdiction as "byproduct materials." Prior to its enactment, jurisdiction
over mill tailings after the licensed mill operations ceased was in some doubt. The
principal hazards from mill tailings are release of radionuclides, such as radon gas. See
Bremberg, supra note 19, at 177-178.
" Quivira Mining, 866 F.2d at 1260 (citing EPA's Final Environmental Impact
Statement).
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cedure rather than informal rulemaking. 99 The court found that
the rulemaking process did not indicate any disadvantage to
Kerr-McGee. The corporation had availed itself fully of the
opportunity to comment on proposed regulations. And, over the
course of two separate comment periods (presumably meaning
also the periods before and in between rulemakings), Kerr-McGee
had neither approached the NRC with procedural objections nor
asked to present oral argument or cross examine witnesses. Additionally, since the program afforded post-rule protections in
the form of site-specific licensing procedures, Kerr-McGee would
later have an opportunity to present arguments for any desired
deviations from the rules as applied at its site. 0"
Other ex-APA factors may be implied as fitting within the
court's analytical framework. These include congressional interventions to preclude and later weaken the eventual rules, and
extensive regulatory analysis studies. These factors undoubtedly
affected NRC's final rule choices. Congress had interceded on
several occasions following the passage of UMTRCA, blocking
enforcement and later amending UMTRCA so as to require
economic balancing in the rulemaking."'' Also, the rulemaking
record incorporated a substantial pre-rulemaking record. This
pre-rulemaking record included separate environmental impact
statements (EISs) prepared by NRC and EPA, and a Regulatory
Impact Analysis (RIA) prepared by EPA. The EISs provided
opportunities for public involvement prior to the rulemaking.
Additionally, the RIA fulfilled the UMTRCA economic balancing requirement.
The Quivira court's inclination to view the totality of circumstances around this rulemaking demonstrates the court's sense
that ex-APA factors may be relevant in a rulemaking fairness
case, although perhaps not alone dispositive. The close nature
of the industry/agency relationship in this case is an additional

"

Id. at 1261-62.

100 Id.

101See Bremberg, supra note 19, at 206-07. A congressional embargo prohibiting
implementation of UMTRCA in Agreement States (states which have cooperative federalism programs under the AEA) lasted three years. In 1980, after EPA had missed

compliance with the UMTRCA regulatory development timetable, NRC issued interim
regulations. In 1981 Congress refused to appropriate funds for NRC implementation of
those. regulations. In 1983 Congress amended UMTRCA to require economic balancing
in the rulemaking and to establish a type of variance procedure for states to alter the
NRC-issued regulations if warranted by local conditions. The program has been enforced
since 1983.
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factor. The court emphasized this relationship by references to
post-rule licensing, as well as pre-rulemaking, access opportunities that existed over the course of two rulemaking efforts.
EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Costle
A panel of the D.C. Circuit considered a post-rulemaking
settlement agreement that dictated certain pre-rulemaking activities in Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle. °2 This agreement
pertained to EPA's implementation of the Clean Water Act. The
terms in issue required EPA to "initiate preliminary investigations as a first step toward determining whether or not to promulgate regulations." 10 3 As thus characterized, the obligations of
EPA under the modified agreement were not subject to noticeand-comment procedures under the APA.1°4 Accordingly, the
court found that EPA was under no legal obligation to inform
the public of its investigatory activities leading up to possible
rulemaking, although it could request participation from affected
industry members and others if it chose to do so. 0 5
This is not quite as harsh as it might seem on first blush.
Actually, as the court pointed out, the agreement provided for
EPA to give quarterly briefings on the status of activities. Obviously this forum would provide opportunity for dialogue regarding the program.106Additionally, EPA followed certain policy
practices highly supportive of public notice values. The court
noted that "EPA's practice in developing effluent limitation
guidelines has been to solicit comments on the preliminary findings of its investigatory programs before publishing proposed
regulations. "107

EDF v. Costle is part of a protracted and
'= 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
complicated litigation involving EPA's implementation of the Clean Water Act. The
case was before the D.C. Circuit on five occasions and spawned amendments to the
Clean Water Act in 1977. Reported opinions in this litigation include: Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Citizens for a Better
Env't. v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975). A settlement
agreement approved by the District Court, NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2120 (D.D.C. 1976), became the focal point of much of the litigation.
! Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1255.
904
Id.
0 Costle, 636 F.2d at. 1255-56.
0 Id. at 1256.
107 Id.
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The court considered an additional source of public notice
values. It found that the Clean Water Act's public participation
requirements (a hybrid rulemaking feature), as interpreted by
EPA, did not require application in this context. EPA's interpretive regulations limited these activities to "plans" or "programs" given financial assistance by EPA. Since this prerulemaking activity did not fit that standard, EPA did not
implement the public participation rule. The court found that
EPA's interpretation of this provision of the Clean Water Act
was entitled to deference.108
The companies also argued, unsuccessfully, an infringement
of their due process protections. The court questioned whether
the companies were entitled to "effective notice" of the modifications because the companies' "interest" in the investigatory
program, although genuine, did not concern "immediate and
direct" effects on their business activities. The notice-and-comment phase of informal rulemaking based upon the investigatory
program would, the court reasoned, provide a safeguard of any
due process rights that the companies might have. The court
further observed that assuming arguendo the companies were
entitled to notice, EPA's actions provided adequate notice. EPA
gave the companies ten days to comment on proposed modifications, which they did. Then, after submittal to the District
Court, the proposed joint modification was subject to comment
for a three week period.'09
The Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle opinion, consistent with the others in this Part, finds that ex-APA pre-rulemaking activities fall outside of APA protections. At the same
time, of course, it wrestles with the fairness of these activities,
noting favorably the quarterly notices and brief comment opportunities.
In re: Permanent Surface Mining Litigation II, Round III
Judge Flannery of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia was not disposed to accord weight to ex-APA factors
in his In re: Permanent Surface Mining Litig. II, Round lip 0
decision. This case was part of an extended litigation involving

101
Costle,

636 F.2d at 1256-57; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (Supp. II 1978).
Costle, 636 F.2d at 1257.
,1122 Env't. Rep. Cases (BNA) 1557 (D.D.C. 1985).
301
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the OSM's permanent program regulations under the Surface
Mining Control & Reclamation Act (SMCRA). This decision
concerned challenges brought by environmental groups and state
regulatory authorities regarding OSM's 1983 "Valid Existing
Rights" (VER) rulemaking, alleging inadequate notice under the
APA's informal rulemaking procedures."'
SMCRA prohibits surface mining on certain categories of
properties, unless the mining is to be conducted pursuant to
valid existing rights on the date of enactment. Interpreting the
meaning of this term has been daunting. This particular rule
adopted a constitutional takings standard as the definition of
VER, i.e., if prohibiting mining would amount to a takings of
the coal property under the fifth amendment then the coal owner
qualified as having VER in the property. The original rule proposal, however, had not set out that option among the three
different VER schemes proposed for comment-mere ownership
of coal, ownership of coal plus the contractual or property right
to mine by surface methods, or ownership of coal plus2 a good
faith attempt to obtain all permits for surface mining."
After quickly dispatching the Government's argument that
the rulemaking was not legislative (and hence not subject to
judicial review), ' 3 the court analyzed the rulemaking renoticing
issue. The court looked at the actual comment record tied to4 the
promulgated rule and found that renoticing was required."1 Of
significance to the court was the fact that commenters had
focused on the proposed mechanical tests "and did not anticipate
the possibility that the approach of using a mechanical test would
be jettisoned in favor of the approach finally taken." ' s The
court observed that the concept of VER was related to takings
but that mere mention of the takings idea in selected comments
was not adequate notice to all commenters of this alternative
6
possibly being chosen as the final rule."
Following the statement of its holding, the court examined
other arguments raised by the defendants. Of specific interest,
after the close of the comment period on the proposed rule, the

Id. at 1558-59.
Id.

," Id. at 1559-60.
"" Id. at 1562.
I'
Id.
,,6 In re: Permanent Surface Mining Litig. Round II, Round III, 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. at 1562.
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Secretary (OSM) had issued a final environmental impact statement (EIS) on the rules. The EIS had indicated the Secretary's
preference for a VER rule based on constitutional takings. At
that stage, several parties sought reopening of the rulemaking
comment period." 7 Others submitted comments during the postcomment period on the new takings rule idea mentioned in the
EIS. On this basis, the Government argued that the parties had
actual notice of the final rule and, in fact, had commented upon
it even though not through a noticed rulemaking comment period.
Apparently, the court did not give weight to these developments precisely because it "was left with the impression that the
[post-rulemaking comment period] comments made were never
seriously considered by the Secretary. This impression comes
from the fact that the preamble to the rule as finally promulgated
did not address, in even the most indirect way, the objections
raised to the preferred, broad approach."" 8 The result in this
case is not really at odds with the prior decisions that have
implicitly recognized notice connections in the ex-APA activities
and sources. Notice is a two-edged sword-it must inform the
public and the public's response must be considered in the agency
decision making.
One other aspect of this litigation may distinguish its result.
The rule in question in this case had very significant policy
implications as far as the substantive impact of SMCRA. This
is because VER relates to the one aspect of the regulatory scheme
that the environmental community holds nearest and dearestnamely the outright prohibition of mining from specified categories of lands, including some types of environmentally sensitive
areas.1" 9 Given that dimension of the case it is conceivable that
the court reasoned that, if it became known that the takings test
was an option, there would naturally be a larger segment of the
population with genuine interest in the rulemaking than merely
the participants that had been tracking the EIS and earlier rule
proposals. In any event, it is apparent that had OSM given a
thorough treatment to the negative post-rulemaking comments
it might have swayed the court in the other direction.

Id. at 1563-64.
Id. at 1564.
See SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
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Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency
Another fairness challenge was made in Neighborhood Toxic
Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly.120 There Judge Brotman, of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
upheld an EPA Superfund site rulemaking. At issue was the
application of a statutory judicial review limitation precluding
2
review of a remedial action remedy for a New Jersey Superfund1 '
site. The court found the EPA's Record of Decision' 22 (addressing site remediation plans) to be a rulemaking. 23 Because it was
a rulemaking, the plaintiffs' expectations of due process were
"relatively minimal: [EPA] must provide notice and allow public
comment."' 2 '
In finding that the Record of Decision process and subsequent activity complied with due process, the court noted that
EPA had informed the public of its plans and had solicited
comments. In addition, the state agency supervising the site
cleanup delayed implementation after rule promulgation to solicit additional public comments.'2 Plaintiffs were also unable
to demonstrate to the court that newer studies (not in the rulemaking record) had turned up information not already considered by EPA.' Moreover, the plaintiffs had other avenues to
pursue this matter, since comlmon law or other alternate state
26
remedies were not precluded by the federal statutory scheme.1
As in the other lower court cases discussed above, the APA
process alone was sufficient for upholding the agency actions on
fairness grounds. But again, the court was inclined to take the

120

716 F.Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989).

The "Superfund" program is established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675, as
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA").
" The CERCLA/SARA citizens suits provisions (42 U.S.C. § 9659(a), as limited
by § 9613(h), the court found, precluded judicial review in certain circumstances, among
them the stage of EPA adopting a Record of Decision. Neighborhood Toxic, 716 F.Supp.
at 833-34.
Im The court characterized the process of EPA developing a remedial action plan
and Record of Decision for a Superfund site as a hybrid of adjudication and rulemaking,
but found the action before it most akin to a rulemaking because of its prospective
application and broad affect on the thousands of people living near the site. Neighborhood Toxic, 716 F.Supp. at 836.
I2

'u

Id."

Id. The State agency is the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP").
"2 Neighborhood Toxic, 716 F. Supp. at 836-37.
'2
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further step of weighing the ex-APA factors in the balance.
Although the factors included post-rulemaking in this instance,
the usage and significance of the elements in the court's analysis
remains consistent with that of the other lower courts. The
significance of this case is its apparent factoring of post-rulemaking access, alternative common law remedies, and supplemental factual data as considerations in the fairness analysis.
The New Jersey U.S. District Court's decision again shows the
growing tendency to consider sources outside of the APA process.
The Case Lessons
These cases all suggest that ex-APA activities have a role in
rulemaking fairness analysis. Courts do consider these factorsif not under a "hard look," at least something less rigorous. If
nothing else, the courts are pleased to see agencies involving the
public in procedures beyond the minimal APA level. The exact
role of that involvement remains open to question. To date the
courts' ex-APA source considerations have not been clearly the
dispositive aspect of any case. However, it is very reasonable to
infer that some weight is being given to these elements. It must
be carefully noted that these cases do not involve examples of
rulemakings approaching anything close to sham dimensions.
Although each of these cases could have been decided without
a second thought given to ex-APA factors, such cases that have
examined ex-APA actions in the course of rulemaking review
may someday be afforded weight in support of using ex-APA
analysis.
The sham rulemaking issue will probably be the next step in
factoring of ex-APA sources into fairness analysis. Consider the
future likelihood, for example, of a relatively short public comment period on a proposed technical standard rule which is the
27 It
product of several years of pre-rulemaking negotiations.
would certainly be fair to say that the participants in those
negotiations will have had a "preponderant influence."' And,
likewise it might be reasonably inferred that public comments
will not have much substantive play in the final rule determi-

127

The nuclear waste repository rulemaking will be just such a scenario, assuming

the negotiation is followed by an informal rulemaking as seems most likely at this point.
1'
To borrow the phrase of Professor Stewart. See supra note 37.
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nation. Would that be a sham rulemaking? Most surely it would
be found to be so, unless the reviewing court was inclined -to
consider the fairness, such as it might have been, of the prerulemaking negotiation period. That consideration, in turn, would
likely depend upon how the rulemaking record is assembled and
how artful the negotiators are in supplementing the record with
appropriate comments (to indicate some bases for the negotiated

results). ,29
III.

OUTREACH AND OTHER PRE-RLEMA K G CONTACTS

Pre-rulemaking practices are of both the mandatory and free
form variety. Required practices include the rulemaking analyses
undertaken to support rules, 30 the publication of rulemaking
agendas, and any applicable hybrid rulemaking features. The
informal group is dominated by agency-directed outreach activities.
Rulemaking Agendas
The rulemaking agendas "I' serve as an invitation for lobbying activity that the agencies may or may not choose to openly
accept. 3 2 The agendas, however, are non-binding' 33 and are
I" An Administrative Conference study suggested that parties participating in nonpublic rulemaking sessions should "protect" their agreed rules from APA-based judicial
review by agreeing in advance of public noticed comment periods (1) what each of the
parties would put into the "rulemaking record" and (2) what the agency would later
state as the rationale for its "final rule." Administrative Conference of the United
States, Office of the Chairman, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking, 100-101 (1983).
m See supra note 60.
"'
Executive Order 12291 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act require twice yearly
(October and April) publication of a rulemaking calendar. As stated in the Order, this
is "an agenda of proposed regulations that the agency has issued or expects to issue,
and currently effective rules that are under agency review..." Exec. Order No. 12291,
46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981), Section 5(a), reproduced in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
"I It is ironic that this aspect of federal administrative practice has not gained a
large state following. Most states have administrative procedure laws that provide for
rulemaking methodologies, but only California has added the calendar feature to its
rulemaking program. CAL. Gov. CODE 11017.6 (West Supp. 1990). This provision
requires publication of an annual rulemaking calendar, including the names of the agency
organization unit responsible for the rulemaking and contact persons at the agency. In
addition, the agency must send this calendar to the author of each statute with a
description of the priority assigned to the rulemaking. See, Houston and Renfrow, A
Comparative Analysis of Rulemaking Provisions in State Administrative Procedure Acts,
6 PouIcy STu iEs REvmw, No. 4, 657-665 (May 1987) (The authors included this
California provision as a ranking factor in a comparison of state rulemaking provisions).
" "Nothing in this section precludes an agency from considering or acting on any
matter not included in a regulatory flexibility agenda, or requires an agency to consider
or act on any matter listed in such agenda." 5 U.S.C. § 602(d) (1988).

1990-91]

PIE-RULEmAKiNo FAIRNEss

probably exempt from judicial review in most applications. The
Administrative Conference, in fact, insists that agendas should
34
be structured so as to avoid any prospect of judicial review.
The Conference does, however, support public intervention in
agenda prioritization.' 3' Regulatory agendas, published in the
Federal Register, are not to be confused with other types of
records of regulatory development status.
Most other pre-rulemaking records are probably protectible
from disclosure through application of Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act. 3 6 However, it appears that disclosure
is not routinely denied unless it would concern pending Presidential or Cabinet-level review decisions. 37 As the D.C. Circuit
38
found in Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Services,
the disclosure policy is properly determined by the agency in this
circumstance. 39
Open Meetings Policies
Open meetings policies are a factor at a few agencies. The
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), for example,

13" In its general recommendation regarding rulemaking in the area of cancer-causing
chemicals, the Administrative Conference found that the rulemaking schedule rankings,
the result of inter-agency planning, should be tentative and not subject to judicial review.
Federal Regulation of Cancer-Causing Chemicals, Part II (ACUS Recommendation 825), 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-5 (discussed at 52 Fed. Reg. at 23,630 nn.l, 2 (1987)).
" See, e.g., Priority Setting and Management of Rulemaking by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (ACUS Recommendation 87-1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-1,
52 Fed. Reg. 26,629 (1987).
16 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552. Exemption 5 is 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982).
,17See Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 768 (D.C.
Cir., en banc 1988).
138

Id.

I" Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 775. Judge Bork, writing for the majority, questioned the
relevance of Judge Ruth B. Ginsburg's reference to IRS policies in this matter, particularly in light of certain exemptions from OMB rule review that some IRS rulemakings
fall under. Id. at n.6. Judge R. Ginsburg, in dissent, observed that it would be extraordinary for administrative units to relate to one another in as rigid a manner as the
majority opinion had, in her view, posited. Judge R. Ginsburg cited, for comparison,
the commercial report, BNA, Report by Legislation and Regulations Division of Internal
Revenue Service's Office of Chief Counsel on Status of Regulations Projects, as not
only disclosing such information as the names of responsible administrators and subject
matter of various actions, but as indicating a common stated reason for transmittals
within the bureaucracy as "returned for revision." Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 780, note
(unnumbered) (R. Ginsburg, dissenting).
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has taken a statutory directive to cooperate with the public' 40 as
the basis for its meetings policy. This policy commits CPSC to
"conduct its business in an open manner free from any actual

or apparent impropriety.'

'1 4'

CPSC maintains a calendar of its

activities, through which the public may learn of planned meetings with outside parties. 142 Records are kept of all such meetings
43
and are made freely available to the public.
These policies are applied to meetings regarding any "sub-

stantial interest" matters, i.e., any non-trivial issue "that is likely
to be the subject of a regulatory or policy decision by the
Commission.'' " Generally, notice is given at least seven days in

advance of a meeting. 45 Any person can attend CPSC meetings
involving substantial interest matters, or may attend other meetings at the discretion of the meeting chairperson.146 However,

telephone conferences are discouraged. If callers raise substantial
matters during any telephone conferences, the agency employees
are urged to discontinue the conference. The employees must in
47
any case keep a telephone call summary which is made public.
Through these measures CPSC generally keeps lobbying out in
the open.

Perhaps most significantly for the protection of notice values, the CPSC dropped a proposed rule which would have
exempted from the public notice requirements all meetings involving "early, exploratory" stages of an issue. That possible
loophole had been opposed in rulemaking comments submitted
by several private and public consumer agencies.1' 8

'o The Consumer Product Safety Commission, as the agency charged with implementing the Consumer Product Safety Act, is obligated to provide the Congress and
President an annual report including, among other things, a summary of
the extent of cooperation between Commission officials and representatives
of industry and other interested parties in the implementation of this Act,
including a log or summary of meetings held between Commission officials
and representatives of industry and other interested parties;...
Consumer Product Safety Act § 270)(8) 15 U.S.C. § 2076(j)(8), (1972).
" 16 C.F.R. § 1011.1(b) (1990).
12 16 C.F.R. § 1011.4(a).
143 16 C.F.R. § 1012.1(a). The two principal kinds of records kept are meeting
summaries and transcripts. The transcripts are usually taken at hearings or meetings
concerning complex subjects where exhibits may be discussed. 16 C.F.R. § 1012.5.
- 16 C.F.R. § 1012.2(d).
14
16 C.F.R. § 1012.3(a).
1 16 C.F.R. § 1012.4(a).
147 16 C.F.R. § 1012.7.
I" See 46 Fed. Reg. 38,322 (1981) (preamble discussion of comments).
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FACA Committees
Another source of notice values is the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA), which, although seemingly avoided at
all costs in most pre-rulemaking settings, 49 provides significant
procedural safeguards where applicable."10 Despite the widespread efforts to circumvent its application,"' in some negotiated
19 The Administrative Conference adopted recommendations in 1980 stating it
believed that the Act was not applicable to ad hoc, unstructured, non-continuing groups
and that the General Services Administration's guidelines should make this clear. Coverage of such groups, according to the Administrative Conference, would not further
the purposes of the Act. Interpretation and Implementation of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, (ACUS Recommendation 80-3) 1 C.F.R. § 3045.80-3, 2(a) (1983). The
GSA did adopt the Conference's views in its preliminary regulations. 48 Fed. Reg.
19,323-31 (1983).
-0 The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. I (1988), establishes rigorous procedural standards for committees that meet its definition of advisory
committee:
"any committee board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force,
or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof
(hereafter in this paragraph referred to as "committee"), which is(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more
agencies or officers of the Federal Government except that such term
excludes (i) the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (ii)
the Commission on Government Procurement, and (iii) any committee
which is composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of the Federal
Government.
5 U.S.C. app.I, § 3(2).
" In several contexts the agencies and private interest groups have gone to extremes
to avoid application of FACA. One of the more peculiar examples involved the Department of Justice's longstanding relationship with the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary (a group that reviews the merits of judicial
appointment decisions). While a FACA-based challenge to this relationship was pending
before the Supreme Court, the ABA published the gist of its scheme for FACA avoidance
in the event the Supreme Court was to rule against its position. The ABA Journal
reported this scheme as follows:
Mhe committee could preserve confidentiality by obtaining the names of
nominees from public announcements rather than accepting the names of
prospective nominees from the attorney general before there has been a
nomination or an announcement to the public. That change would sever
the thread between the ABA and the Justice Department-the thread upon
which the lawsuit hangs.
"A loss wouldn't mean the committee would go out of business," says a
committee source. "But we don't think we're going to lose."
Reidinger, "Separating Powers, Nominating Judges," ABA Journal, June 1989, pp. 6064,64.
In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, et al., -U.S.
109 S.Ct. 2558 (1989) the Court found the practices involving the ABA Committee and
the Department were not subject to FACA.
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rulemakings (a form of pre-rulemaking) FACA chartered advisory committees are utilized. One example of this application is
the pending nuclear waste repository rules for which the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has retained the Conservation Foundation as facilitator. 5 2
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has an extensive
FACA program, 53 although a close reading of the FDA's FACA
rules shows wide exceptions for many classes of pre-rulemaking
activities. Either in cases of its convening of groups, or its
utilization of existing groups, FDA exempts from FACA application the following, among other categories:
-groups convened on an ad hoc basis but which have no
54
continuing function or organization;
-private experts consulted by FDA on rulemaking issues; 155
-groups that provide only information, as opposed to advice
or opinions;5 6 and
-routine meetings between FDA and "any committee representing or advocating the particular interests of consumers, in157
dustry, professional organizations, or others.
In addition, the activities of the recognized advisory committees
outside of formal business meetings are exempt from regulation.158
In the event of FACA-covered meetings, the FDA provides
Federal Register notice of the meeting schedule, including agenda
items and whether hearing testimony or written comments may
be submitted to the committee." 9 Records are kept of the meetings, either in informal minutes form'6 or as transcripts.' 6 The
records are available for public inspection. 162

1,2 52

Fed. Reg. 29,024 (1987).

21 C.F.R. pt. 14 (1989).
1- 21 C.F.R. § 14.1(b)(5)(i).
21 C.F.R. § 14.1(b)(5)(iii).
"4 21 C.F.R. § 14.1(b)(6)(ii).
21 C.F.R. § 14.1(b)(6)(iii).
"
21 C.F.R. § 14.1(bX10Xc) ("This part applies only when a committee convenes
to conduct committee business. Site visits, social gatherings, informal discussions by
telephone or during meals or while traveling or at other professional functions, or other
similar activities do not constitute a meeting.").
23 21 C.F.R. § 14.20.
21 C.F.R. § 14.60.
1

161
21 C.F.R. § 14.61.
1- 21 C.F.R. § 14.75.
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On-Record Contacts As Part of Extended, Multi-Stage
Rulemaking
Several agencies have had success conducting stakeholder
contact sessions during noticed rule comment periods or in the
interlude between rule proposals. Technically, an interlude between rule proposals is a pre-rulemaking period in that activities
that occur during this hiatus are not subject to APA processes.
If closely spaced, however, agencies may treat the entire episode
as being essentially on-record. For example, the Mineral Management Service (MMS) apparently used this approach in its
development of revised coal product valuation regulations and
related topics. In its process, stretching over two years, MMS
held some closed-door meetings with stakeholders, but generally
kept records of the meetings. Thus, the closed door meetings
were functionally the equivalent of submitted rulemaking comments which became part of the reviewable record.163

163 These regulations are primarily economic regulations, as the formulae contained
in the regulations dictate royalty payment rates applicable to certain Government-leased
coal producing lands. The process included an initial 90-day comment period and a
following reopened period of two weeks'duration. Public hearings and meetings of the
Royalty Management Advisory Committee also occurred during the initial comment
period. An outreach-style meeting with industry, state, and Indian representatives also
occurred during the initial period. The minutes of the meetings, transcripts of the public
hearing and RMAC meeting, and written comments received by MMS were incorporated
into the rulemaking record. Later the MMS reopened the comment period for 69 days
to solicit comments on a proposal submitted on behalf of the coal and electric utility
industries. Contemporaneously, MMS completed two rulemakings to adopt new product
valuation, regulations for oil and gas. These processes included draft rules, and two
further notices of proposed rulemaking with draft final rules appended. After the
comment period for the industry proposal closed, MMS held three days of open meetings
with representatives of the Western States, Indiana Tribes, and the coal and electric
utility industries to review a draft of the proposed rule. In response to the comments at
this session, MMS established a new 60-day comment period for the proposed rulemaking
during which MMS conducted a public hearing, the minutes of which were incorporated
as rulemaking record. The period from initial notice of proposed of rulemaking to
publication of the final rule consumed two years. The initial notice appeared at 52 Fed.
Reg. 1840 (1987) and the final rule appeared at 54 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1989). See Paragraph
1 (Introduction) at 54 Fed. Reg. 1840.
Following an intervention from some members of the Congress (see supra, note
24), the MMS went forward with a further notice of proposed rulemaking (setting out
in the appendix a draft final rule) as directed. However, prior to promulgating final
rules, it reopened the comment period two more times. As part of the reopened comment
period activities MMS held several meetings with stakeholders, for which it kept records.
53 Fed. Reg. 1230 (1988). The coal regulations were issued in final form at 54 Fed. Reg.
1492 (1989). It has also chartered an advisory committee, which considers implementation
issues arising under these regulations. See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,415 (1989) (notice of meeting
of the Royalty Management Advisory Committee).
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Off-Record Outreach in Pre-Rulemaking
Regulatory outreach is one example of institutionalized ex
parte activity in the pre-rulemaking period. Through regulatory
outreach programs administrative agencies maintain contact with
their constituencies as part of regulatory development activities.
One of the leading proponents of this practice, the Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), has recognized five kinds of outreach activities (these are neither precluded nor mandated by statute.)'" The five are: (1) advice or
comments on regulatory development priority setting, scheduling, and planning;' 65 (2) background briefings and working
groups;'1" (3) draft regulatory language reviews;6 7 (4) regulatory
facilitation or facilitated rulemaking (an informal process of
requesting participation from affected interests in the development of proposed rules);'" and (5) regulatory negotiation or
negotiated rulemaking (a formal process through which affected
interests participate in development of proposed, or even final

rules). 1
This program is a product of battlefield psychology-OSM
put it in place because of its large calendar of remanded rules.' 70

SMCRA rulemaking authority is very general: the Secretary, acting through the
OSM, shall "publish and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes and provisions of this chapter." 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(2). The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia District is vested with jurisdiction to
review the rules of the OSM. 30 U.S.C. § 1276.
161Correspondence of May 8, 1985, Jed Christensen, OSM Director, to "Recipient"
(Stating that OSM's first Regulatory Development Schedule that was completed on May
1, 1986, represented the first time OSM had employed its Outreach Program "to obtain
advice from industry, environmental groups, and State Regulatory Authorities.")
I" SeFY 87 OSMRE Regulatory Outreach Plan (October 2, 1986).
167

Id.

I" Id. OSM used facilitated rulemaking in one instance, that of a rulemaking for
experimental mining practices. That process did not lead directly to a proposed rulemaking. See discussion infra, note 194.
"6 Id. OSM has not utilized the formal negotiated rulemaking process.
170 OSM developed a summary. outline of its Regulatory Development Program
which it provided with its FY 1987 Regulatory Outreach Plan. In this outline OSM
noted that the agency faced a large number of rulemakings, approximately 60, which
were derived from remands, petitions, agency initiatives and commitments, and congressional action. Accordingly, the agency formulated a basic conclusion that:
in order to reduce the delays and litigation at the end of the process of
rulemaking, OSMRE w'ould have to spend additional time and resources
in the front end of the process. To the extent that consensus could be
obtained and rulemaking would be improved at the beginning, we could
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The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA or
the Act), which these rules are designed to implement, is primarily of the "technology standard" genre of environmental
protection statutes.' 7' The Act establishes a national regulatory
program addressing the surface impacts of all forms of coal
mining. Responsibility for implementation is divided between
OSM and states qualifying under the Act's cooperative federalism standards.
SMCRA states a rigorous body of technology standards, but
interpretation of some of its language has been very difficult.
This aspect of the statute led Judge Abner Mikva to suggest that
because of the urgency of its enactment and concommitant ambiguities of language, the necessity of resort to legislative history
was an "absolute given.' ' 72 In many areas however, SMCRA

reduce the uncertainty and instability at the end of the process.
Undated Memorandum, OSMRE's Regulatory Development Program (Apparently from
the February 21, 1986 initial meeting of OSM's Rulemaking Outreach Program).
On the occasion of the transition to the Bush Administration,
a state agency
lobbying group, The Interstate Compact Commission, criticized the rulemaking track
record of OSM:
State programs have been hampered by constant changes to federal regulations and unending demands by OSM that States change their rules to
conform to the everchanging federal regulations. The net result has been
a continual rulemaking process in most States which has created uncertainty
for operators and the environmental community, and diverted important
state agency resources from program management to "paper shuffling"
activities. Changes to OSM regulations should be limited to those which
make a clear improvement to the program, and thereby avoid the disruptive
cycle of litigation and subsequent additional rule modifications.
Interstate Mining Compact Commission, "Report to the Transition Team, Department
of the Interior, Policies and Programs to Implement the Surface mining Control and
Reclamation Act," at 3 (December, 1988).
"I HousE AND SEnu., RusH ro Poucy-UsINo ANALYTic TECHNIQUES IN PUBLIc
SEcTOR DECISION MAKINo 100-115 (1988). (The legal requirements of most environmental
protection laws, on a section-by-section basis, can be divided into "technology standards" or "ambient standards." SMCRA is largely a technology standard statute. Hence,
it defines the performance, procedures, or equipment that must be employed to achieve
a desired reduction in emissions or reduction in occurrence. In contrast, ambient standards define levels of pollutants, contaminants, or hazards that are acceptable in the
environment).
As a technology standard statute, SMCRA structurally limits the discretion of the
executive, acting through OSM. SMCRA is in a broad sense only slightly less restrictive
from the executive's viewpoint than the laws that dictate specific numeric standards
(e.g., auto emissions). In the case of the latter, an agency's regulations simply mimic
the law, and quantitative analyses for rulemaking purposes--cost benefit, risk, and
effectiveness analyses-are wholly irrelevant as the Congress has implicitly determined
the standard.
I Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuE L.J. 380, 381 ("It
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"specifies mining procedures in a level of detail not unlike an
operating engineer's handbook,'"7 and thereby limits the rulemaking discretion of the OSM and primacy states. OSM rules
have been particularly vulnerable to substantive or "statutory
duty" challenges and, hence, OSM has moved toward fuller
preamble synopticism. 7 4 This is achieved, in part, by scoping
issues through regulatory outreach. Not all outreaches lead to
rulemaking, and not all OSM rulemakings are foreshadowed by
an outreach. The availability of outreach is probably favored
generally by those invited to participate.175 The general public
typically receives its first inkling of an outreach effort after the

is not surprising that when the statute came before the courts there were some ambiguities.... And yet, what should Congressman Udall have done-spend another twenty
years trying to find more precise words to set forth his ideas concerning proper stripmining law, even though he might never get 218 of his colleagues to agree with him
again? It is this exigency that makes the necessity of reviewing legislative history an
absolute given.") This material is quoted in U.S. DEPARTMENT op JUSnCE, OFFCE OF
LEGAL PoLIcy, "UstNG AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY: A RE-EvALUATION OF THE
STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION" (January 5, 1989) at
73. (The Office of Legal Policy identifies three predominant instances in which courts
will resort to legislative history to clarify statutory meaning: (1) when the meaning is
not plain (2) when possible specified applications of.general language are considered;
and (3) when there are apparent statutory "gaps." The Office cites the Mikva excerpt
in its section on unplain meaning.
Thus, the awkwardness of an underlying statutory scheme is, without question, one
the principal factors influencing regulatory development policy. As indicated, in the
circumstance of the OSM, a substantial portion of the program regulations did not clear
judicial review the first time-leading to a large group of remands (second generation
rulemaking).
'M House AND Smu., supra, note 171, at 100-15.
" Under the "statutory duty doctrine" a reviewing court answers the substantive
question of whether the rule is in accord with the provisions of the enabling statute.
This "doctrine" has insulated the agencies from Presidential control and helped to
maintain the force of 1970s environmental protection statutes. See generally, M. Shapiro,
supra, note 48.
"Synoptic" records demonstrate a decisionmaking process in which all facts have
been determined, all alternative policies have been considered, all values have been
identified and placed in an order of priorities. The agency then selects the alternative
that best achieves the values given the facts. Id. at 466, n.21. This concept is in large
part an outgrowth of Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
171 See correspondence of February 1, 1988, J. Dixon Earley, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources to Richard L. Miller of OSM.
("The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania applauds OSMRE's objective of involving major
external groups in regulatory development. We feel soliciting opinions during the development of proposed regulations is a positive step in the state-federal partnership needed
to efficiently and effectively administer SMCRA.")
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fact-in Federal Register notices of comment periods or in the
176
preambles to final rules.
At first, OSM's outreach did not focus upon rulemaking
solely,' 7 but interest in using the outreach process in development of specific rule proposals soon followed. 78 In organizing
its rulemaking calendar for outreach the first time, OSM subdivided and assigned outreach dates to 21 potential proposed
rules. The rule topics were grouped into divisions of (1) background briefings and working groups (14 topics); (2) reviews of
draft regulatory language (5 topics); and (3) facilitated/negoti179
ated rulemakings (2 topics).
As it has been actually practiced by OSM, outreach has
involved the agency initiating contact with representatives of its
principal constituencies' 0 on such matters as setting the rule-

The preamble to OSM's final prime farmland rule states:
"On March 19, 1986, OSMRE involved major external groups in its
regulatory process through an outreach program designed to obtain comments on initial drafts of significant rulemakings prior to development of
proposed regulations. Nine commenters provided comments to OSMRE on
the initial draft of these prime farmland rules." 53 Fed. Reg. 40,828,
40,829 (1988).
1" Before it evolved into a mainstay of second generation rulemaking, OSM's
outreach program sought out views of major groups in the community on such issues
as: (1) how to improve rulemaking by identifying different approaches to rulemaking,
including facilitated and negotiated rulemaking, as well as outreach procedures; (2)
establishment of regulatory priorities; and (3) improvement of communication with
outside groups. In the area of regulatory priorities, the outreach program employed a
professional facilitator, Keystone Center, under a contract let in December of 1985.
OSM "held three outreach meetings with major representatives of external groups plus
an internal meeting of the OSMRE top management." The schedule included a February
21 meeting to lay out a proposal for the outreach activity, an April Imeeting to develop
a consensus on rulemaking priorities, an April 23 meeting of the Directorate to develop
a final schedule, and a July 30 meeting with the outreach group "to obtain input on
regulatory priorities and input about how outreach should be done and on which rules,
and which rules should be considered for facilitated rulemaking." "OSMRE's Regulatory
Development Program," undated memorandum attached to FY 87 OSMRE Regulatory
Outreach Plan (October 2, 1986).
17 The American Mining Congress' Ed Green had expressed a desire to involve the
participants from the first prioritization outreach in specific outreach activities. June 19,
1986 correspondence, Jed Christensen, OSM to Ed Green, American Mining Congress.
I" See FY 87 OSMRE Regulatory Outreacp Plan (October 2, 1986).
"8 The outside outreach participants are *likely to include individuals
from the
major OSM constituent bodies-state regulatory authorities, the coal industry, and the
public interest environmental litigation groups. The first OSM outreach meetings concerned prioritization of the agency's rulemaking calendar. Early in 1986 the agency held
outreach meetings under the direction of a meeting facilitator. Subsequently the process
became less formal, with face-to-face meetings less likely.
Attendees of the initial meeting included persons associated with the Mining and
176
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making agenda, drafting of "potential proposed rules,' ' 8' and
other policy activities.'8 Generally, these are handled without
public notice, but notice is sometimes given. 83 The term "outreach" is not necessarily always applied to describe the practices.'8 OSM usually did not announce the outreach activity to
Reclamation Council, American Mining Congress, National Coal Association, National
Wildlife Federation, Western Interstate Energy Board, Interstate Mining Compact Commission, the OSM's Regulatory Development & Issues Management group, and the
Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior. March 5,1986 correspondence, Jed
Christensen, OSM to Gary L. Merritt, Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources,
and enclosures.
M The agency prefers to circulate potential proposed rules-draft rules that have
not yet been made public as proposed rules through publication in the Federal Registerfor advance outreach review by the affected parties.
An odd sequence of events led OSM to reject the idea of revising a definition
,,2
of "support facilities" through second generation rulemaking. The first generation rule
had defined support facilities in terms of proximity to mine operations. Following
invalidation of that rule, OSM issued a notice of rule suspension and proposed to abolish
the definition through future rulemaking. It received comments in response to this notice.
OSM later stated in the preamble to a final regulation defining "coal preparation" that
it would propose a new definition of "support facilities." OSM also consulted with its
field offices regarding the practices of states. The field offices indicated only two
instances in which states were served with notices questioning whether or not particular
facilities should have been regulated as support facilities. The 1987 outreach participants
indicated that support for the definition was not strong, and, in fact, based on these
discussions, OSM was unable to develop a definition using categories of facilities.
Outreach participants also noted that a firm definition would impair flexibility in finding
which facilities met the threshold "resulting from or incident to" standard. Thus, as a
result of developing an outreach dialogue, OSM's outreach constituency dropped support
for a rule defining the term. On June 22, 1988, OSM issued a proposed rule notice
which indicated its plan to remove the "support facilities" definition from the permanent
regulatory program (30 C.F.R. § 701.5). 53 Fed. Reg. 23,522 (1988) (Proposed rule).
Note that the second generation rule never advanced beyond the pre-rulemaking phase;
it was killed in outreach.
" In 1990, OSM sought dialogue on a "notice of inquiry" which regards possible
changes to some select engineering-based elements of the permanent surface mining
program. The inquiry is a response to enforcement problems in the area of highwall fill
settling and inefficient (untimely) reclamation of the mountain top removal operations.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 14,319, 19,637 and 25,983 (1990) (comment periods on "notice of
inquiry"). This may perhaps lead to a notice of proposed rulemaking. It is distinguishable
from outreach in that the general public has been notified of the inquiry, rather than a
select group.
I" In an August 3, 1988 proposed rule concerning permits for special categories of
mining and special permanent program performance standards (alluvial valley floors),
OSM mentioned its outreach activity without expressly using the term "outreach." A
discussion .ofthe proposed rule states:
"In developing the proposed rule, OSMRE solicited and received comments on
draft rule language from citizen and environmental groups, industry trade associations,
and State regulatory authorities. These comments have been considered in drafting the
rule." 53 Fed. Reg. 29,310 (1988) (Proposed rule amending 30 C.F.R. pts 701 and 785);
Final rule promulgated 54 Fed. Reg. 9724 (1989).
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the public until publication of proposed rules (the start of APA
processes), only maintained records of some, but not all contacts, and changed the list of participants in the outreach group
from time to time. OSM has considered all forms of outreach
recommendations as non-binding, although the policy direction
85
is probably well established by the conclusion of outreach.
Additionally, OSM advises the outreach groups of judicially
imposed conditions or its agreed settlement terms t86 For example, in its outreach for a second generation prime farmland rule
OSM informed its outreach group' 7 of its intent to comply with
a court decision "in a manner which is practical, environmentally
s
protective and which will conserve prime farmland.'p
Outreach groups are formed for each outreach event, although the groups include representatives of the OSM's three
OSM always maintained that the process was informal and nonbinding. The
agency clearly notes in outreach correspondence regarding draft rules that the drafts are
not yet proposed rules and that the comment period under the APA will follow a later
notice. See e.g., December 7, 1987 correspondence, OSM Director to Ed Green, American Mining Congress (re: Abandoned Mine Land program).
38 In an October 29, 1987 proposed rule notice concerning civil penalties OSM
solicited public comments to follow up outreach comments. The proposed rules under
consideration were to implement the terms of a settlement agreement in Save Our
Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, No. 81-2238 (D.D.C. June 7, 1985). Nevertheless,
OSMRE had proceeded with a "Draft Regulatory Language Review" outreach phase
(OSM mailed drafts of the rule to its outreach list). Noting conflict between several of
its outreach comments and the settlement agreement-based rule language, OSM sought
to bolster the rulemaking record with repeats of the outreach comments. It stated:
Comments received during this phase for this rulemaking activity have been
reviewed but have not been incorporated into the proposed rule because
the rule is being proposed in accordance with the suggested language of
the SOCM agreement and some of the suggestions provided in outreach
would represent significant changes from the language of the SOCM agreement.
However, OSMRE wishes to solicit comments on the specific suggestions

resulting from the outreach program and wants to ensure that any such
suggested changes are formally submitted as part of the rulemaking process

and are incorporated in the administrative record for the rulemaking.
52 Fed.Reg. 41,666-69, quoting 68 (1987) (Proposed rule amending 30 C.F.R. pts. 845

and 846).
"0 Included were the American Mining Congress, National Coal Association, Interstate Mining Compact Commission, Environmental Policy Institute, Mining and Reclamation Council of America, Galloway and Greenburg, the Illinois South Project Inc.,
Land Reclamation Division of the State of Illinois, Indiana consultant Russ Bolding,
Ohio Environmental Council, Law Professor Mark Squillace (currently at the University

of Wyoming), Citizens for Preservation of Knox County, Issac Walton League of
Hunterton, Indiana, Indiana Division of Reclamation, and Ohio Division of Reclamation.
,, This language is included in the preamble to OSM's proposed prime farmland
rule. 52 Fed. Reg. 9644, 9645 (1987).
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principal stakeholder alignments-primacy state agencies, coal
industry companies or organizations, and active public interest
litigation groups. 189 Outreach ordinarily does not involve representatives of other federal agencies, the Congress, or the Executive Office of the President.

Outreach procedures are not formalized in any type of policy
manuals or directives, although informal ground rules have from
time to time surfaced in singular outreach efforts and planning. 9° One outreach in which OSM did keep records was in
connection with its second generation prime farmland reclamation rules.' 9' In other instances, OSM staff persons have actually
tossed out accumulated outreach comments at the start of the
relevant APA comment period. 192 Arguably, the. records could
prove to be of little use in the actual rulemaking, or otherwise.
The Federal Trade Commission has found, in the context of its

,0There have been 30 core outreach leaders and a group of 400 or so persons who
generally receive copies of Federal Register rule publications. There is some overlap
between the groups. Telephone conference with OSM's Andy Devito, February 16, 1989.
This overlap leads to some confusion on the part of the public; however, it is quite
clear that OSM varies the outreach group for each draft rule proposal and has never
allowed the groups to grow large. See correspondence of January 19, 1988, Tom
FitzGerald, Kentucky Resources Council, to Richard Miller, OSM (complaining about
being left off the mailing group for a draft rule and requesting inclusion in the future

mailings of draft regulations).
For example, documentation of OSM's first outreach meeting identifies a frame190
work for rule prioritization: (1) group rules appropriately to avoid piecemeal rulemaking;
(2) avoid changing existing rules or regulations unless necessary; (3) proceed on rules
that produce efficiency and effectiveness in program activities, mining operations, and/
or environmental protection; (4) assign high priority to resolution or stabilization of
*rules that directly control operations; (5) finalize rules affecting permit requirements; (6)
take account of interest groups' concerns as part of priority setting; (7) base priorities
on the degree of programmatic impact a new rule will achieve; (8) consider the real or
potential legal aspects of rulemaking. Undated Outline, OSMRE Rulemaking Outreach
Program, Suggested Criteria For Rulemaking Priority Setting, attachment to Correspondence of March 5, 1986, Jed Christensen, OSM Director Designate, to Gary L. Merritt,
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.
"I'The two outreach programs organized under a set procedure were prime farmland and contract blocking. These files contain entry logs, others do not. The process
has been very informal. Telephone conference with OSM's Andy DeVito, March 9,
1989.
'" OSM tossed out records from a civil
penalty rule outreach at the point of
Federal Register notification of proposed rulemaking.
Sometimes informal pre-NPRM meetings are 'not called "outreach" for reasons
that are unclear. Thus, in the context of the owner/operator rule some face-to-face
meetings of industry and environmental community leaders were held, but with no
agreement being reached. Records of these types of meetings are not routinely available
either. Telephone conference with OSM's Andy DeVito, February 12, 1989.
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statutory outreach programs, that its outreach records were not
used in rulemaking, apparently because participants treated outreach as a separate, preliminary step and started over at the
rulemaking stage. 193
In its experimental mining practices "facilitated rulemaking"
(an informal negotiated rulemaking, apparently without a mandate to reach consensus) OSM invited participantsse to a meeting
to discuss possible rule proposals. In advance of the meeting the
OSM provided the participants a summary of the regulatory
background, program implementation background, regulatory
issues, the regulations in existence at the time of the meeting, a
list of practices that had been approved under the subject ex-,
perimental mining regulations, and the experimental practices
provisions in State Regulatory Programs, among others.' 95 As is
custom in OSM outreach, in circulating draft rules for comment
OSM clearly delineated that the draft was not a proposed rule
and that, should a proposed rule eventually be published for
notice-and-comment rulemaking, the outreach comments would
not be considered in the final rulemaking. 96

191See Koch and Martin, FTC Rulemaking Through Negotiation, 61 N.C.L. REv.
275, 291 (1983).
11 Correspondence of March 23, 1987, OSM Director to Anthony Abar, Maryland
Bureau of Mines, and enclosures. For the followup meeting of the experimental mining
group, the list of invitees was changed to include representatives of the Western Interstate
Energy Board, AMAX Coal Company, and Pennsylvania and omit representatives of
the National Wildlife Federation and Mining and Reclamation Council. Correspondence
of December 9, 1987, OSM Acting Director to Gred Conrad, American Mining Congress,
and enclosures.
91 OSM invited representatives of the Maryland Bureau of Mines, American Mining
Congress, National Wildlife Federation, Mining and Reclamation Council of America,
Interstate Mining Compact Commission, Environmental Policy Institute, and the Washington, D.C. law firm of Galloway and Greenburg. Correspondence of March 23, 1987,
OSM Director to Anthony Abar, Director, Maryland Bureau of Mines, and enclosures.
I" The Director emphasized the status of the proposal:
I would like to stress that this draft rule is not yet a proposed regulation,
but instead, is being distributed so that OSMRE may have the benefit of
public review and input prior to initiating proposed rulemaking. A proposed regulation will be prepared in consideration of the comments received
on this draft rule and will apppear in the Federal Register with time allotted
for public review and commments prior to the development of the final
regulation.
At this stage, the list of persons on the "Outreach Leadership Group" had grown to
include representatives of the American Mining Congress, National Coal Association,
Interstate Mining Compact Commission, Western Interstate Energy Board, Environmental Policy Institute, the Washington, D.C., law firm of Galloway and Greenburg, and
the agencies of 25 states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
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The pattern of outreach use at OSM is well illustrated by its
incidental coal extractions rulemaking. The regulation of incidental coal extractions led to second generation rulemaking on
OSM's own initiative.197 SMCRA provides that mining activity
in which the extraction of coal does not exceed 16-2/3 percent
of the tonnage of minerals removed for purposes of commercial
use or sale are exempt from the jurisdictional definition of
surface coal mining operations. 198 This incidental mining exemption first appeared in a 1973 precursor of SMCRA and was
carried in the several bill drafts leading up to SMCRA enactment
in 1977.' 99 OSM's first regulations simply restated the provision
of SMCRA. 2 o Later, the regulations were reorganized and procedural rules were added. 20'
However, OSM recognized a lack of specific guidance in its
regulations for the determination of exempt status. To address
this it published guidelines,2 an ANPRM seeking comment on
SMCRA section 701(28),2 01 and began a regulatory outreach.
OSM considered the outreach comments in the drafting of'proposed 1987 rules.2 After the initial informal rulemaking comment period closed, OSM twice revised the proposed rule and
reopened the comment period-the second time in response to
comments from the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs. 205 The final rule appeared in late 1989.20
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. OSM received written comments from two public interest
groups, the Kentucky Resources Council and the Environmental Policy Institute, agencies
of 13 states, and the Association of Abandoned Mine Land Programs which represents
28 jurisdictions (states and Indian Tribes). The commenting state agencies represented
Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Correspondence of
December 7, 1987, OSM Director to Edward M. Green, American Mining Congress,
attachments, and responses to the proposals as indicated.
,I" The current regulations were promulgated as final rules at 54 Fed. Reg. 52092
(1989). The bulk of these regulations are codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 702.
SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291.
See S. 425, 93rd Cong. (1973). These developments are summarized in 54 Fed.
Reg. at 52,092 (1989).
44 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (1979); 30 C.F.R. § 700.11 (1979). Similarly, the reference
in the abandoned mine reclamation fund regulations simply incorporated the statutory
language. 30 C.F.R. § 870.11(d) (1979).
-- 47 Fed. Reg. 33,424 (1982).
49 Fed. Reg. 19,338 (1984).
49 Fed. Reg. 19,336 (1984).
52 Fed. Reg. 20,546 (1987).
- The comment period was first reopenned by notice at 53 Fed. Reg. 54,30 (1988).
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Lessons From the Pre-Rulemaking Practices
The Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) open
meetings policy stands in stark contrast to the realities of agency/
stakeholder dialogue at most agencies. One might indeed wonder
why that is. Perhaps it is because the premise behind agency/
stakeholder dialogue is not "notice values" but something else.
Perhaps the premise encompasses attempts at preference aggregation by agencies gun shy from remands and other missives
fired by a judiciary impatient with particular regulatory programs. Preference aggregation alone-arguably no more legitimate a premise for technical standard rulemaking than quotient
verdicts-should probably not be the key premise. Nevertheless,
keeping abreast of the constituencies' views is certainly a legitimate goal because it points out trouble spots in the statutory
and regulatory scheme.
Perhaps the greatest disappointment of the policy structure
in the pre-rulemaking realm is the apparent impotence of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Agencies engaged in
activities closely approximating negotiated rulemaking would be
required to keep records of contacts and open meetings to the
public if the negotiators were constituated as a FACA Committee. If this were the case there would be very little doubt as to
whether a subsequent informal rulemaking incorporating the
FACA records could survive fairness reviews (assuming no irregularities).
OSM's version of outreach and the closely related on-record
meetings policy of MMS should be able to meet the concerns
that a FACA structure would clearly answer. Substantively, there
must be little difference between the MMS approach of stop/
start rulemaking (in which stakeholders have significant input in
the area of proposed rule language) and an outreach that circulates draft rules. The difference, obviously, is that the MMS
approach assures that these kinds of comments find their way
into a reviewable record, whereas the outreach comments of
OSM have actually found their way into the trash can.
Do the members of OSM's constituency have a particular
reason for wanting to keep outreach comments off-record? Given

Subsequently, OSM announced a third comment period by notice at 53 Fed. Reg. 13,415
(1988).
54 Fed. Reg. 52,092 (1989).
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the continuum of litigation that engulfs the OSM permanent
program regulations, there certainly is a risk that a party will
have to "eat crow" at some point because of comments directed
to a draft proposal that, technically speaking, would not itself
be the subject of judicial review. It's like being held accountable
for legislative history. However, this problem could be solved at
the agency level.. If OSM changes its draft regulations it should
clearly state that previous comments are no longer being considered. As it stands, OSM alleges that it has relied upon outreach
comments in developing proposed rule language while at the
same time discarding these records. OSM should be able to
choose to ignore the records. However, if OSM relies upon them,
the burden of discrediting the records should fall on the parties.
A party can then clarify a prior comment through submittal of
a subsequent comment during rulemaking.
The other puzzle is less easy to solve. Is there a general
disadvantage to informing the public of planned outreaches? In
effect, MMS does this through flying trial balloon regulations.
However, by displaying these regulations MMS becomes susceptible to the wrath of the Congress or energy industry lobbyists.
Does the regulatory agenda accomplish enough of this objective?
Certainly, the wise use of the semi-annual regulatory agenda
by interested parties should assure a reasonable notice of likely
outreach activities. Its use can easily lead to on-going dialogue
with the agencies. Agency culture is a problem here. It appears
that most of the environmental policy agencies (at least those
considered in this article -OSHA, OSM, EPA, and NRC) are
inclined to engage in dialogue. Not to say they are exposing the
generally secretive OIRA review processes, but it's clear that prerulemaking information, and sometimes actual draft rule proposals, are getting around. The paranoia of the FDA stands in
contrast.
It appears from informal discussions that OSM believes the
published rulemaking agenda (which in their case is a product,
in part, of outreach) has a connection with the interested community. That is probably true. And, OSM's habit of announcing
outreach after the fact in final rule preambles and otherwise is
certainly a signal that interested parties should follow up on.
Generally, then, the agenda policy is a plus for notice values.
However, the added step of an on-site calendaring of outreach
meetings, per the CPSC, would be an even greater plus.
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IV.

PRE-RUEMAINO FAIRNESS

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT SHOULD THE COURTS

Do WITH PRE-

RULEMAKING INFORMATION?
The notice values business is rather murky. To the extent
the courts are inclined to discuss pre-rulemaking, it seems almost
inadvertent. Perhaps it is easier to consider all of the available
information than to split hairs over what is and is not in the
reviewable record. I think that the courts have shown a generally
favorable reaction to pre-rulemaking practices that are supportive of notice values. Again, not in an outcome determinative
fashion, but just in general. It's a soft look approach. Where
will it go?
I suspect that some agencies are creating various expectations
of process that may, some day, become enforceable through the
judiciary. If OSM uses outreach for every second-generation
rulemaking it ever faces, does its failure to do so at some stage
mean a party has an enforceable interest in outreach? Probably
not. But what might happen is a court finding that OSM has
"cut somebody out of the loop," indicating at least an inference
of impropriety. Unless the agency can clearly establish that it is
free from lobbying activity altogether OSM is far better off to
continue with some level of orchestration to assure that all
possible points of view are before it. Whether this is called
outreach or something else, ultimately it is the absence of the
process that raises questions of fairness, not its presence. This
is the context in which judicial review might someday evaluate
such questions.
Selective record incorporation of pre-rulemaking information
also raises avenues for consideration on review. This is the
Alaska Miners scenario. The key is for the agencies to assure
that comment opportunities are reasonable. The presence of
extensive pre-rulemaking contacts greatly enhances the argument
on behalf of the agencies.
Continued reference to these activities by the courts will, I
think, encourage more policies favorable to fairness values. It is
quite apparent that short of something approaching a sham
rulemaking, pre-rulemaking activity is not going to lead to a
finding of unfairness (either as a due process or APA claim).
But the fairness values are supported by the policies in place.
In the future, litigators should remain sensitive to the political history of rulemakings. One never knows what might turn
up. Still, I would urge caution in the use of pre-rulemaking
information in litigation over rule fairness. The existing practices
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are not obtrusive. Further record keeping obligations are not
warranted as long as the general objective, as in the case of
OSM, is to involve all affected interests.

